2027 Elections: Forensic Institute calls for ‘stress test’ of INEC’s technology six months to elections

Abstract
The Chartered Institute of Forensics and Certified Fraud Investigators of Nigeria (CIFCFIN) has urged the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct a mandatory, forensically-tracked public stress test of its electoral technology, including the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), six months before the 2027 general elections. This call, made on Democracy Day, aims to bolster public confidence and ensure the integrity of the upcoming polls, following significant challenges and legal disputes surrounding the use of technology in the 2023 elections. The Institute also advocates for pre-election forensic vetting of candidates' credentials and the embedding of forensic analysts within INEC's results collation system to detect real-time manipulations.
Introduction
As Nigeria gears up for the 2027 general elections, the integrity and transparency of the electoral process remain paramount concerns for stakeholders. In a significant intervention, the Chartered Institute of Forensics and Certified Fraud Investigators of Nigeria (CIFCFIN) has issued a compelling call for a mandatory, forensically-tracked public stress test of the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) electoral technology. This demand, articulated by CIFCFIN's Founder and Chairman, Governing Council, Iliyasu Gashinbaki, on Democracy Day, underscores the critical need to address lingering doubts and enhance public trust in the nation's democratic institutions.
The proposed stress test, to be conducted not later than six months before the elections with live broadcast results, is a direct response to the operational challenges and extensive legal contestations that characterized the deployment of technology in the 2023 elections. This article delves into the legal and practical implications of CIFCFIN's recommendations, examining the existing electoral framework, past judicial pronouncements on electoral technology, and the potential impact of such proactive measures on the credibility of the 2027 polls for legal practitioners and the broader public.
Background
The legal framework governing elections in Nigeria has progressively embraced technology, particularly with the enactment of the Electoral Act 2022. This legislation provided INEC with broad powers to deploy technological innovations for various aspects of the electoral process, including voter registration, accreditation, and result management. Key technological tools introduced include the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) for voter authentication and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) for the electronic transmission and viewing of polling unit results.
Sections 47(2), 50(2), and 60(5) of the Electoral Act 2022 are particularly relevant, empowering INEC to determine the mode of voter accreditation and result transmission. While these provisions were intended to enhance transparency and curb electoral fraud, their implementation in the 2023 general elections faced significant hurdles. Reports indicated system malfunctions, delays in result transmission, and a general erosion of public confidence due to the perceived failure of these technologies to perform optimally. The subsequent legal challenges highlighted ambiguities in the law, particularly concerning the mandatory nature of electronic transmission, which ultimately led to judicial interpretations that often prioritized manual results over electronic records.
Recent legislative efforts, including amendments to the Electoral Act, culminating in what is referred to as the Electoral Act 2026, have sought to address some of these gaps. Notably, the President signed a harmonized version of the bill into law in February 2026, aiming to provide a more coherent framework. However, some analyses suggest that the Electoral Act 2026 may have codified conservative judicial precedents from the 2023 cycle, potentially subordinating electronic logs to manual Form EC8A.
Analysis
The call by CIFCFIN for a stress test, while not explicitly mandated by the Electoral Act 2026, aligns with INEC's inherent powers and its Policy on Election Technology Acquisition and Deployment (PETAD). Sections 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and 148 of the Electoral Act 2022 (which forms the basis for the current Act) empower INEC to make regulations and guidelines for the effective discharge of its functions, including the deployment and management of technology. PETAD itself emphasizes public engagement, awareness campaigns, and clear performance metrics for monitoring technical performance. A public stress test, therefore, could be seen as a robust exercise of these powers, enhancing transparency and fulfilling the spirit of public engagement.
However, the efficacy of such a stress test must be viewed against the backdrop of judicial precedents from the 2023 election petition cycle. Courts, including the Supreme Court, ruled that the Electoral Act 2022 did not *mandate* electronic transmission of results, leaving it to INEC's discretion. This interpretation meant that even where electronic results were available, manual forms often held primacy in legal challenges. Cases such as *Adegboyega Oyetola & Anor v Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors (2023)* and *Adeleke Ademola v Adegboyega Oyetola & Ors (2023)* exemplify the complexities and judicial stance on the evidential weight of electronic records versus manual results. The reported codification of these conservative judicial precedents in the Electoral Act 2026, which allegedly subordinates electronic logs to Form EC8A, presents a significant challenge to the full impact of a stress test focused on electronic systems.
Beyond the stress test, CIFCFIN's broader recommendations include pre-election forensic vetting of academic certificates, birth records, and tax clearance certificates of candidates, as well as embedding forensic analysts within INEC's results collation system. These suggestions aim to tackle issues of certificate forgery and document manipulation, which have historically plagued Nigerian elections and led to numerous pre-election disputes. The integration of forensic experts could provide real-time detection of anomalies, potentially reducing the volume and complexity of post-election litigation. Comparatively, other jurisdictions, such as India, have successfully integrated technology and legal structures to enhance electoral integrity, demonstrating the potential benefits of a balanced approach to technological dependency and legal oversight.
Despite INEC's repeated assurances of its capacity for electronic transmission, the gap between technological capability and legal enforceability, as highlighted by the 2023 elections, remains a critical issue. A comprehensive stress test, coupled with clear legislative backing for the primacy of verified electronic results, could bridge this gap. The current amendments to the Electoral Act, which introduce technology-driven methods for the service of legal processes in election petitions, indicate a legislative willingness to embrace digital solutions in other aspects of the electoral justice system, yet the core issue of result transmission remains contentious.
Conclusion
The call by CIFCFIN for a mandatory, forensically-tracked public stress test of INEC's technology six months before the 2027 elections is a timely and crucial intervention. It highlights the imperative of rebuilding public trust and ensuring the integrity of Nigeria's electoral process, particularly in light of the mixed performance and legal challenges associated with electoral technology in 2023. For legal practitioners, this development signals a continued evolution in electoral jurisprudence, necessitating a deep understanding of both the technological aspects and the nuanced legal interpretations surrounding them.
Practitioners must be prepared to advise clients on the implications of an electoral framework that, while embracing technology, still grapples with the evidential weight of electronic records versus manual documentation. The emphasis on forensic vetting and real-time anomaly detection suggests a shift towards more scientific and verifiable electoral processes, which will undoubtedly influence the nature of pre- and post-election litigation. As the 2027 elections approach, stakeholders, including the legal community, must advocate for robust implementation of such proactive measures and clarity in the legal framework to ensure that technology genuinely serves as a guarantor of free, fair, and credible elections.
Citations
- 1.Electoral Act 2022
- 2.Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
- 3.Adegboyega Oyetola & Anor v Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors (2023)
- 4.Adeleke Ademola v Adegboyega Oyetola & Ors (2023)
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