After Slaughter and Cook: future Fed fights, and maybe some midnight firings

The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued pivotal decisions in `Trump v. Slaughter` and `Trump v. Cook`, significantly reshaping the landscape of presidential removal power over federal agency heads. In `Trump v. Slaughter`, the Court, by a 6-3 majority, overruled the nearly century-old precedent of `Humphrey's Executor v. United States`, holding that the 'for cause' removal provision for Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioners violates the separation of powers. This decision grants the President at-will removal authority over most independent agency leaders exercising executive power. However, in a companion 5-4 ruling in `Trump v. Cook`, the Court upheld the 'for cause' removal protections for Federal Reserve Board members, emphasizing the unique historical independence of the central bank. These rulings clarify, and in some cases, expand presidential control over the administrative state, while carving out a specific exception for the Federal Reserve.

The U.S. Supreme Court has, in recent years, consistently signaled a skeptical view of the insulation of federal agencies from presidential control. This trend culminated in two landmark decisions issued on June 29, 2026: `Trump v. Slaughter` and `Trump v. Cook`. These cases directly confronted the constitutional limits on presidential removal power, particularly concerning the heads of so-called 'independent' agencies. The outcomes have profound implications for the structure and operation of the administrative state, fundamentally altering the balance of power between the executive branch and regulatory bodies.

At the heart of these disputes lies a long-standing tension in American constitutional law: the President's Article II power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' and the congressional prerogative to establish agencies with a degree of independence. The Court's recent pronouncements, particularly the explicit overruling of `Humphrey's Executor v. United States` in `Slaughter`, represent a significant reassertion of unitary executive theory. While `Slaughter` broadens presidential removal authority over many independent agencies, `Cook` carves out a narrow, but crucial, exception for the Federal Reserve, underscoring the Court's nuanced, albeit often ideologically divided, approach to agency independence.

The constitutional debate over presidential removal power traces back to the earliest days of the Republic, but modern jurisprudence largely begins with `Myers v. United States`, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In `Myers`, the Supreme Court held that the President possesses an exclusive power to remove executive branch officials whom he has appointed with the Senate's advice and consent, and that Congress generally cannot restrict this power. This broad interpretation of presidential removal authority was, however, famously limited less than a decade later in `Humphrey's Executor v. United States`, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

`Humphrey's Executor` involved President Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to remove Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner William Humphrey, despite a statutory provision limiting removal to 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.' The Court unanimously ruled that Congress could constitutionally limit the President's power to remove officials of 'quasi-legislative' or 'quasi-judicial' independent agencies, distinguishing such roles from the 'purely executive' functions at issue in `Myers`. This distinction became the bedrock of the 'independent agency' model, allowing bodies like the FTC to operate with a degree of insulation from direct political control. The Federal Reserve, established by the Federal Reserve Act, also features 'for cause' removal protections for its Board of Governors, reflecting a similar intent to shield it from political interference.

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in `Trump v. Slaughter` and `Trump v. Cook` represent a significant recalibration of the principles established in `Myers` and `Humphrey's Executor`. In `Trump v. Slaughter`, the Court, in a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, explicitly overruled `Humphrey's Executor`, holding that the 'for cause' removal provision for Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioners violates the separation of powers. The Court reasoned that because FTC Commissioners exercise executive power through their rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory functions, they must be fully subject to presidential control, including removal at will.

This ruling aligns with the Court's recent trend, exemplified by `Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau`, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), and `Collins v. Yellen`, 593 U.S. ___ (2021). In `Seila Law`, the Court held that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), led by a single director removable only 'for cause,' was unconstitutional, as it violated the separation of powers. Similarly, `Collins v. Yellen` found the single-director structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) unconstitutional for the same reason. These cases collectively demonstrate the Court's increasing skepticism towards statutory provisions that insulate executive officers from presidential removal, particularly when those officers head agencies exercising significant executive power.

However, the companion case, `Trump v. Cook`, presented a crucial distinction. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the 'for cause' removal protections applicable to Federal Reserve governors. The Court emphasized the Federal Reserve's 'unique historical status and role' and a 'long tradition of central banking protected from political interference.' While the government in `Cook` did not challenge the constitutionality of the 'for cause' provision itself, but rather argued sufficient cause for removal, the Court affirmed that such removals require notice and a hearing, and that the President's determination of 'cause' is subject to judicial review. This creates a narrow, but significant, carve-out for the Federal Reserve, suggesting that its unique functions and historical independence warrant a different constitutional treatment than other independent agencies.

The `Slaughter` decision, by overturning `Humphrey's Executor`, fundamentally alters the landscape for multi-member agencies that exercise executive power, such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), whose commissioners may now be subject to at-will removal. This shift is expected to lead to more rapid changes in agency policy with each new administration, potentially creating uncertainty for regulated industries. The Court's reasoning in `Slaughter` heavily relied on the 'unitary executive' theory, asserting that Article II vests all executive power in the President, who must be able to remove officers who do not align with his policy goals. The contrasting outcome in `Cook` highlights the Court's recognition of certain institutional exceptions, even within a broader framework of expanding presidential control.

The Supreme Court's decisions in `Trump v. Slaughter` and `Trump v. Cook` mark a watershed moment in administrative law, significantly reshaping the balance of power within the federal government. For practitioners, the immediate implication of `Slaughter` is a heightened awareness of increased presidential influence over a wide array of independent agencies. Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, previously thought to be insulated by 'for cause' removal provisions, will now see their leadership and policy priorities more directly tied to the prevailing presidential administration. This could lead to more frequent shifts in regulatory enforcement and policy direction, demanding greater agility from regulated entities in adapting to changing administrative landscapes.

Conversely, `Trump v. Cook` provides a critical, albeit narrow, exception for the Federal Reserve, affirming its unique historical independence and the constitutionality of its 'for cause' removal protections. This distinction underscores the Court's recognition of the central bank's vital role in economic stability, insulated from direct political interference. Looking ahead, practitioners should closely monitor potential legislative responses to `Slaughter`, as Congress may seek to redefine agency structures or removal provisions within the newly articulated constitutional boundaries. Further litigation challenging the independence of other agencies, particularly those with single directors or multi-member boards whose functions are deemed 'purely executive,' is also highly probable, as the Court continues to refine the contours of presidential removal power and agency independence.