Aiding and abetting impunity

The Supreme Court of the United States, in its recent decision in *CISCO Systems, Inc. v. Doe I*, significantly curtailed the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The Court held that federal courts may not create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law under the ATS, effectively closing the door on judicially implied aiding-and-abetting liability for such abuses. Furthermore, the Court clarified that neither the ATS nor the TVPA imposes liability for aiding-and-abetting offenses, impacting both corporations and government officials. This ruling marks a substantial shift in U.S. human rights litigation, limiting avenues for civil redress against entities allegedly complicit in egregious international human rights violations committed abroad.

The landscape of international human rights litigation in the United States has been profoundly reshaped by the Supreme Court’s decision in *CISCO Systems, Inc. v. Doe I*, issued on June 23, 2026. This landmark ruling, which addressed the viability of aiding-and-abetting claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), has delivered an unexpected boon to corporations and government officials alike, effectively shielding them from civil suits alleging complicity in international human rights abuses. The Court's pronouncements have far-reaching implications, significantly narrowing the avenues for victims seeking justice in U.S. federal courts for atrocities committed overseas.

The case originated from allegations by Falun Gong practitioners that CISCO Systems, Inc. provided surveillance technology to the Chinese government, which was then used to identify, detain, and torture them as part of a brutal persecution campaign. The plaintiffs sought to hold CISCO and its executives liable for aiding and abetting these egregious human rights violations. However, the Supreme Court's decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit's finding of potential liability under both statutes represents a decisive move to restrict the judiciary's role in creating and expanding causes of action for international law violations.

This article will delve into the Court's reasoning in *CISCO Systems, Inc. v. Doe I*, examining its impact on the interpretation of the ATS and TVPA. It will trace the historical development of ATS jurisprudence, highlight the specific holdings of the *CISCO* decision, and analyze the practical implications for practitioners navigating the increasingly constrained terrain of human rights accountability in U.S. courts.

The Alien Tort Statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a venerable piece of legislation enacted by the First Congress in 1789. It grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." For nearly two centuries, the ATS lay largely dormant, its precise purpose and scope remaining a subject of academic debate.

The modern era of ATS litigation began in 1980, leading to its application in cases involving international human rights violations. A pivotal moment arrived with *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)*, where the Supreme Court affirmed the ATS as a jurisdictional statute but acknowledged a "very modest authority" for federal courts to recognize new, judicially created causes of action for violations of international norms that are "specific, universal, and obligatory." This opened a narrow pathway for certain human rights claims, though the Court also noted the inherent tension in allowing such judicial creation of causes of action.

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further shaped the ATS landscape. In *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013)*, the Court applied a presumption against extraterritoriality, limiting ATS claims to conduct with a sufficient nexus to the United States. Later, *Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. 241 (2018)*, definitively held that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. These precedents progressively narrowed the statute's reach, setting the stage for the *CISCO* decision to address the specific question of aiding-and-abetting liability, particularly for domestic corporations and individuals.

The Supreme Court's decision in *CISCO Systems, Inc. v. Doe I, 609 U.S. ___ (2026)*, delivered a decisive blow to the expansion of liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. The Court, in a 6-3 ruling, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding unequivocally that courts may not create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law under the ATS. This holding effectively "close[d] the door that Sosa cracked" for judicially created ATS liability, emphasizing that the power to create causes of action rests with Congress, not the judiciary. The majority opinion underscored separation of powers concerns, reasoning that judicially created causes of action for international norms would intrude upon Congress's legislative prerogative and the political branches' authority over foreign policy.

Crucially, the Court also determined that neither the ATS nor the TVPA imposes liability for aiding-and-abetting offenses. Regarding the TVPA, the Court's analysis was straightforward: the statute does not explicitly mention "aiding and abetting" liability, and its silence on the matter is dispositive, drawing parallels to its reasoning in *Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)* concerning the Securities Exchange Act. This aspect of the ruling extends beyond corporations to government officials, providing an "unexpected boon" by shielding them from aiding-and-abetting claims under these statutes.

The *CISCO* case arose from allegations that CISCO Systems, Inc. developed and provided surveillance technology, known as "Golden Shield" software and hardware, to the Chinese government, which was then used to identify and apprehend Falun Gong practitioners who were subsequently subjected to torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and other severe human rights abuses. The plaintiffs had argued that CISCO's knowing participation in developing this technology constituted aiding and abetting these violations. However, the Supreme Court's ruling now means that even if such evidence of complicity were presented, the legal framework under ATS and TVPA, as interpreted by the Court, would not support such claims. This decision significantly narrows the scope of corporate accountability for human rights abuses facilitated by technology or other means, particularly when the primary perpetrators are foreign governments.

This ruling represents a significant departure from the Ninth Circuit's prior stance, which had found aiding and abetting liability actionable under both the ATS and TVPA, and that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged CISCO's knowing participation in a domestic context. The Supreme Court's decision effectively eliminates a key mechanism through which victims of international human rights abuses sought to hold corporate actors and government officials accountable in U.S. courts, further solidifying the trend of limiting the ATS's application that began with *Kiobel* and *Jesner*. The Court's emphasis on legislative prerogative over judicial innovation in this area signals a more constrained future for human rights litigation under these statutes.

The Supreme Court's decision in *CISCO Systems, Inc. v. Doe I* marks a critical juncture in the evolution of human rights litigation under U.S. federal law. By definitively rejecting judicially created causes of action for international norms under the ATS and precluding aiding-and-abetting liability under both the ATS and TVPA, the Court has erected significant barriers for victims seeking redress against corporations and government officials allegedly complicit in human rights violations abroad. This outcome underscores a judicial philosophy that prioritizes separation of powers and congressional authority in defining the scope of such liability, even at the expense of potential avenues for justice for victims of severe abuses.

For practitioners, the implications are profound. The ruling necessitates a re-evaluation of strategies for pursuing accountability for international human rights abuses, particularly those involving corporate complicity. While the Court's decision limits recourse under the ATS and TVPA, it may spur exploration of alternative legal theories, state-level claims where applicable, or increased reliance on international mechanisms and advocacy. Attorneys must now navigate a more restrictive legal landscape, where the emphasis will likely shift towards legislative action to establish explicit causes of action for aiding and abetting human rights violations, or to clarify the extraterritorial reach and scope of existing statutes. The decision also highlights the ongoing tension between judicial interpretation and the political branches' role in addressing complex issues of international human rights and foreign policy.