Audit Service Bill - Obey Rule of Law or Resign, Atiku Challenges Tinubu

Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar has publicly challenged President Bola Tinubu to either assent to the Federal Audit Service Bill or formally communicate his reasons for withholding assent to the National Assembly, failing which he should resign. This challenge underscores a critical constitutional and governance issue in Nigeria: the President's prolonged inaction on a vital piece of legislation designed to reform the nation's public audit system. The Bill, passed by the National Assembly, aims to repeal the archaic Audit Ordinance of 1956, establish an independent Federal Audit Service, and enhance the powers of the Auditor-General for the Federation, thereby strengthening public finance management and anti-corruption efforts. Presidential silence on such a significant bill raises concerns about adherence to the rule of law and institutional accountability, particularly given the explicit constitutional timeframe for presidential action on legislation.

The call by former Vice President Atiku Abubakar for President Bola Tinubu to either sign the Federal Audit Service Bill into law or formally decline assent, citing constitutional obligations, has brought to the forefront a significant legal and governance dilemma in Nigeria. This ultimatum highlights the executive's role in the legislative process and its implications for transparency and accountability in public finance. The Federal Audit Service Bill represents a crucial reform initiative, long sought to modernize Nigeria's audit framework and empower its supreme audit institution.

President Tinubu's alleged prolonged inaction on the Bill, which has been passed by both chambers of the National Assembly and transmitted for presidential assent, has sparked debate over constitutional adherence and the principle of the rule of law. This article delves into the legal framework governing presidential assent in Nigeria, examines the historical context and necessity of the Federal Audit Service Bill, and analyzes the potential ramifications of continued executive inertia for public accountability and democratic governance.

The legal foundation for public audit in Nigeria is primarily enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Sections 85, 86, and 87 establish the Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation (OAuGF), outlining its powers, duties, and independence. Specifically, Section 85(2) mandates the audit of public accounts of the Federation and all its offices and courts, with reports submitted to the National Assembly. However, the constitutional provisions are broad, and the detailed operational framework for the OAuGF has historically relied on the Audit Ordinance of 1956.

Critically, the Audit Ordinance of 1956 is widely considered obsolete and, arguably, no longer an extant law, having been omitted from the Revised Editions of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria in 1990 and 2004. This legislative lacuna has left the OAuGF operating without a comprehensive, modern statutory framework, severely limiting its institutional independence, operational autonomy, and enforcement powers. The Federal Audit Service Bill, therefore, seeks to fill this critical gap by repealing the outdated 1956 Ordinance, establishing a robust Federal Audit Service and Board, and significantly strengthening the powers and functions of the Auditor-General to align with international best practices for supreme audit institutions. This reform is deemed essential for enhancing legislative oversight, bolstering anti-corruption efforts, and improving public confidence in the management of public funds.

The crux of the current legal challenge lies in the President's constitutional obligation regarding legislative assent. Section 58(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) explicitly states that where a bill is presented to the President for assent, "he shall within thirty days thereof signify that he assents or that he withholds assent." This provision imposes a clear timeframe for executive action, designed to prevent indefinite delays and ensure the smooth functioning of the legislative process. President Tinubu's alleged failure to act on the Federal Audit Service Bill for several months, without formally communicating his decision or reasons to the National Assembly, constitutes a potential breach of this constitutional mandate.

Should the President withhold assent, Section 58(5) provides a mechanism for the National Assembly to override the presidential veto. If the bill is again passed by each House with a two-thirds majority, it shall become law without the President's assent. Civil society organizations, such as the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), have already urged the National Assembly to consider invoking these veto powers if the President continues to delay or fails to provide satisfactory reasons for withholding assent. The importance of the Federal Audit Service Bill cannot be overstated, as it aims to address the current weakness in enforcing audit findings, which often leads to recommendations being ignored without consequence.

Comparative analysis with other jurisdictions, such as South Africa, highlights the global trend towards strengthening supreme audit institutions. South Africa's Public Audit Act, 2004, for instance, significantly enhanced the Auditor-General's powers, including the ability to issue certificates of debt and take binding remedial action against officials responsible for financial losses. The Nigerian Bill seeks similar 'legal teeth' to compel compliance with financial discipline, moving the OAuGF beyond its current advisory role. The delay in assenting to this Bill not only perpetuates a legal vacuum but also undermines Nigeria's commitment to international accountability standards and the fight against corruption. The rule of law demands not just the existence of laws, but also their timely and proper application by all arms of government.

The ongoing impasse surrounding the Federal Audit Service Bill underscores a fundamental tension between executive prerogative and legislative intent, with significant implications for Nigeria's governance framework. President Tinubu's continued inaction, in apparent contravention of the 30-day constitutional window for assent or veto, creates an environment of uncertainty and undermines the principles of constitutionalism and accountability. The Bill is not merely a procedural amendment; it is a critical reform designed to empower the Auditor-General for the Federation, close a long-standing legal vacuum, and provide the necessary tools to combat corruption and ensure fiscal discipline in public expenditure.

Practising attorneys and legal professionals should closely monitor developments, as this situation may set precedents for executive-legislative relations and the interpretation of presidential powers under the 1999 Constitution. The National Assembly's potential recourse to its veto powers under Section 58(5) would be a significant constitutional exercise, demonstrating legislative resolve in the face of executive inertia. The timely enactment of the Federal Audit Service Bill is crucial for strengthening Nigeria's public finance management, enhancing transparency, and fostering public trust in government institutions. Its delay continues to expose the nation to vulnerabilities in accountability, making its resolution a matter of urgent national importance.