Brussels to propose ‘dedicated’ tool to pull away from China, trade chief says
Abstract
The European Union is intensifying its 'de-risking' strategy from China, with EU Trade Chief Valdis Dombrovskis announcing a forthcoming 'dedicated tool' to reduce single-supplier dependence in high-risk sectors. This initiative forms part of the EU's broader economic security agenda, aiming to bolster supply chain resilience and strategic autonomy without resorting to full 'decoupling'. Legal professionals must prepare for an evolving regulatory landscape, which is likely to involve enhanced scrutiny of supply chains, foreign investments, and technology transfers, building upon existing instruments such as the Anti-Coercion Instrument, Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and the Critical Raw Materials Act. The new tool is expected to introduce further compliance obligations and strategic considerations for businesses operating within or engaging with the EU market.
Introduction
The European Union is poised to introduce a new legislative instrument aimed at reducing its economic reliance on China, particularly in strategically vital sectors. This development, articulated by EU Trade Chief Valdis Dombrovskis, signals a significant escalation in the bloc's 'de-risking' strategy, moving beyond mere rhetoric to concrete policy action. The proposed 'dedicated tool' is intended to wean high-risk sectors off single-supplier dependence, a clear response to geopolitical tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by recent global events.
This strategic shift is not about 'decoupling' from China entirely, but rather about fostering 'open strategic autonomy' and enhancing the EU's economic security. For legal practitioners, this announcement necessitates a deep understanding of the evolving regulatory framework. The new tool will likely interact with, and potentially expand upon, existing EU legislation designed to safeguard the Union's economic interests, creating new compliance challenges and strategic considerations for businesses engaged in international trade and investment with the EU and China.
Background
The EU's pivot towards economic security and de-risking has been a gradual but determined process, formalized in its European Economic Security Strategy launched in June 2023. This strategy introduced a three-pillar approach—promote, protect, and partner—and identified four key risk categories: supply-chain resilience, critical infrastructure, technology security and leakage, and economic coercion. The overarching goal is to provide a robust framework for assessing and managing economic risks while preserving the EU's economic dynamism.
Several legislative instruments already underpin this strategy. The Anti-Coercion Instrument (Regulation (EU) 2023/2675), which entered into force on 27 December 2023, empowers the EU to take countermeasures against economic coercion by non-EU countries. The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), applicable since 12 July 2023, allows the European Commission to investigate and remedy distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies. Furthermore, the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), effective from 23 May 2024, aims to secure a sustainable supply of critical raw materials by setting benchmarks for domestic capacities and limiting reliance on single third countries. A revised Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Screening Regulation, adopted on 8 June 2026, strengthens national screening mechanisms and expands their scope to include intra-EU investments ultimately controlled by non-EU investors. These instruments, alongside the Dual-Use Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/821) governing exports of items with both civilian and military applications, form the existing legal arsenal for the EU's economic security.
Analysis
The announcement of a 'dedicated tool' to reduce single-supplier dependence suggests either a significant enhancement of existing instruments or the introduction of a novel legislative act. Given the EU's existing comprehensive economic security toolbox, it is plausible that this 'dedicated tool' will serve to consolidate, streamline, and potentially expand the application of current regulations, or introduce specific sectoral measures. For instance, the Critical Raw Materials Act already sets a benchmark that no more than 65% of the EU's annual needs for each strategic raw material should come from a single third country. The new tool could extend such quantitative targets or similar diversification requirements to a broader array of 'high-risk sectors' beyond raw materials, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and biotechnologies, which have been identified as critical.
One potential legal avenue for this 'dedicated tool' could be an expansion of the EU's trade defence instruments (TDIs), which traditionally include anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard measures. While TDIs primarily address unfair trade practices, a new tool could integrate supply chain resilience and strategic autonomy considerations more explicitly into their application, or even create a new category of 'economic security safeguards'. Alternatively, it could manifest as a framework regulation that mandates Member States to implement national measures to identify and mitigate single-supplier dependencies, similar to the approach taken with the FDI Screening Regulation.
The legal challenges associated with such a tool are considerable. Any new measure must be compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, which generally promote non-discrimination and free trade. The EU has historically adopted a 'WTO+' policy on trade defence, implementing stricter rules than necessary, which can sometimes make its instruments less effective. Furthermore, the implementation could face internal market implications, as Member States may have differing economic interests and levels of dependence on China, potentially leading to fragmented application or political resistance. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), for example, already imposes extensive due diligence obligations on companies regarding human rights and environmental impacts in their supply chains, and the new tool could build on this framework by adding economic security due diligence requirements.
Practitioners should also consider the potential for retaliatory measures from China, which has historically responded to perceived trade restrictions. The EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument is designed to deter and respond to such actions, but its effectiveness in a prolonged economic dispute remains untested. The new tool could also introduce new reporting obligations, supply chain mapping requirements, and potentially even direct intervention mechanisms, such as public procurement restrictions or investment limitations in specific high-risk areas, similar to those contemplated under the Anti-Coercion Instrument. The emphasis on 'high-risk sectors' suggests a targeted approach, requiring businesses to meticulously assess their exposure to single-country dependencies and diversify their sourcing and production strategies proactively.
Conclusion
The EU's commitment to a 'dedicated tool' for de-risking from China underscores a fundamental shift in its trade and economic policy, prioritizing resilience and strategic autonomy. For legal practitioners, this means navigating an increasingly complex regulatory environment where economic security considerations will heavily influence commercial decisions. Businesses must proactively audit their supply chains, particularly in identified high-risk sectors, to identify and mitigate single-supplier dependencies. This includes mapping critical inputs, assessing alternative sourcing options, and understanding the geopolitical context of their operations.
Practitioners should closely monitor the legislative developments surrounding this new tool, as its precise scope, enforcement mechanisms, and interaction with existing regulations will be crucial. Advising clients will require a comprehensive understanding of EU trade law, competition law, investment screening rules, and export controls, coupled with an appreciation for geopolitical risk management. Proactive engagement with regulatory bodies and a robust compliance framework will be essential to navigate the evolving landscape and ensure business continuity in an era of heightened economic security concerns.
Citations
- 1.Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion
- 2.Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market
- 3.Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020
- 4.Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast)
- 5.European Commission, European Economic Security Strategy, JOIN(2023) 20 final, 20 June 2023
- 6.Council Regulation (EU) 2026/XXX on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (revised, adopted 8 June 2026)
- 7.Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), agreed 15 March 2024
- 8.Euractiv. Brussels to propose ‘dedicated’ tool to pull away from China, trade chief says. (Source of initial prompt)
- 9.Crowell & Moring LLP. Revised EU FDI Screening Regulation Adopted. June 9, 2026.
- 10.Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. New EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation Falls Short Of Remedying Fragmentation Of National Screening Mechanisms. June 8, 2026.
- 11.Sheppard Mullin. Harmonised, But Not Uniform: The EU's New FDI Screening Regulation. June 12, 2026.
- 12.Wilson Sonsini. Fact Sheet on the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation.
- 13.Arthur Cox LLP. An Overview of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation. October 6, 2023.
- 14.Crowell & Moring LLP. European Commission Publishes Guidelines on Foreign Subsidies Regulation: What Businesses Need to Know. February 12, 2026.
- 15.European Commission. Critical Raw Materials Act. Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs.
- 16.Wikipedia. Critical Raw Materials Act.
- 17.CELIS Institute. The European Union's Critical Raw Materials Act: How Effective In Addressing Supply Chains Risks? June 27, 2024.
- 18.Global Policy Watch. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act enters into force. May 17, 2024.
- 19.European Commission. Protecting against coercion - Trade and Economic Security.
- 20.UK in a changing Europe. The EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument: bazooka or popgun? February 2, 2026.
- 21.Crowell & Moring LLP. EU Anti Coercion Instrument: What It Is and What Businesses Need to Know. February 4, 2026.
- 22.German Marshall Fund of the United States. The EU's Anti Coercion Instrument. February 3, 2026.
- 23.Crowell & Moring LLP. The Anti-Coercion Instrument: What Is It and How Europe Might Use It Over the Next Four Years. February 4, 2025.
- 24.EU Reporter. EU's new anti-coercion instrument would bypass need for unanimity. December 8, 2021.
- 25.Export Control Group. The requirements of Dual-Use regulation in the European Union.
- 26.DIHK. Regulations for the Export of Dual-Use Goods. June 1, 2026.
- 27.European Commission. Dual-Use Items.
- 28.Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment (DETE). Export controls.
- 29.European Commission. Exporting dual-use items - Trade and Economic Security.
- 30.Intereconomics. EU Supply Chain Regulations Between Efficiency and Effectiveness.
- 31.EQS Group. EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) Obliges Companies to Operate in a Fair and Sustainable Manner. August 28, 2025.
- 32.Fractory. European Supply Chain Act - Key Insights. November 21, 2024.
- 33.WifOR Institute. New supply chain laws: What do they mean for companies? March 15, 2024.
- 34.Wikipedia. Trade defence instrument.
- 35.European Union. Trade defence - EU Trade.
- 36.European Parliament. Understanding the EU trade defence toolbox. September 18, 2025.
- 37.AEGIS Europe. Second AEGIS Europe Report on the EU's Trade Defence Instruments. September 6, 2023.
- 38.YouTube. What are the EU's trade defence tools? December 8, 2025.
- 39.Taylor & Francis. The EU's evolving economic-security doctrine. July 14, 2025.
- 40.CSIS. Unveiling the European Union's Major Economic Security Update: Is a True Geopolitical Commission Emerging? December 4, 2025.
- 41.European Council on Foreign Relations. Understanding the EU's new economic security playbook. December 4, 2025.
- 42.European Parliament. New EU economic security doctrine.
- 43.European State Aid Law Quarterly. The EU Economic Security Strategy: a Novel Approach or the Reemergence of an Old Idea? April 19, 2024.
- 44.Analysis of the EU's Economic Security Strategy and its Implications for China: From “Open Strategic Autonomy” to Comprehensive “De-risking”. December 30, 2025.
- 45.VOA. EU Tools Up to Protect Key Tech From China. January 24, 2024.
- 46.European Commission. With geopolitics in mind, EU Commission presents new tool to deter trade wars. Euractiv. December 8, 2021.
- 47.CSBA.org. European Firms Maintain China Manufacturing Ties Amid EU De-risking Efforts. May 29, 2026.
- 48.Bruegel. How to de-risk: European economic security in a world of interdependence. May 7, 2024.
- 49.The Straits Times. EU sees signs China supplying dual-use components to Russia. April 19, 2024.
