Can a Second ‘Pretoria’ Prevent a Return to War in Northern Ethiopia?
Abstract
The recent visit of African Union High Representative Olusegun Obasanjo to Mekelle, following reports of a drone strike in Tigray and controversial legislation from the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), underscores the precarious state of peace in northern Ethiopia. This situation highlights the potential for a return to conflict despite the 2022 Pretoria Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. This article examines the legal and political challenges to sustaining peace, focusing on the implementation gaps of the Pretoria Agreement, the implications of the TPLF's recent legislative actions, and the imperative for a renewed, comprehensive peace initiative to prevent a devastating relapse into war.
Introduction
Ethiopia's northern region finds itself at a critical juncture, with recent developments signaling a worrying fragility in the peace established by the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. The African Union's High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, recently visited Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, a trip that closely followed reports of a drone strike in northwestern Tigray. These events unfold amidst mounting concerns over heightened military mobilization and the unveiling of controversial legislation by the TPLF's self-proclaimed regional government, which observers have characterized as a "blueprint for totalitarian control."
The initial Pretoria Agreement, formally known as the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities, was hailed as a landmark achievement in November 2022, aiming to end a devastating two-year conflict. However, the current political landscape suggests a significant unraveling of its foundational principles, pushing the region to the brink of renewed hostilities. This article delves into the legal and political complexities surrounding the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, analyzing the implications of recent actions by the TPLF and the federal government. It posits that a robust, legally grounded, and politically inclusive "second Pretoria" is urgently needed to reinforce peace, address underlying grievances, and avert a catastrophic return to war in northern Ethiopia.
Background
The conflict in northern Ethiopia, which erupted in November 2020, pitted the federal government and its allies against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), resulting in widespread devastation and a severe humanitarian crisis. After two years of intense fighting, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the TPLF signed the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (CoHA) in Pretoria, South Africa, on November 2, 2022. Mediated by the African Union, with former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as the High Representative, the agreement aimed for an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities, disarmament of TPLF combatants, unhindered humanitarian access, restoration of essential services, and the re-establishment of constitutional order in the Tigray Region.
A key component of the Pretoria Agreement was the commitment to a comprehensive national transitional justice policy, consistent with the Ethiopian Constitution and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework, aimed at accountability, truth-seeking, redress for victims, reconciliation, and healing. Ethiopia's constitutional framework, based on ethnic federalism since 1995, grants significant autonomy to regional states, including the right to self-determination. However, this system has also been a source of tension, with debates over the balance of power between the federal government and regional administrations, and concerns about the disempowerment of non-territorial minorities. The TPLF's pre-conflict administration of Tigray, and its subsequent actions, have often been framed within this complex federal structure, leading to disputes over the legitimacy of regional governance and its relationship with federal authority.
Analysis
Despite the initial optimism surrounding the Pretoria Agreement, its implementation has faced significant challenges, leading to what some describe as a "structural unraveling" of the peace process. A major point of contention has been the TPLF's recent actions, including the decision to reinstate the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament) and elect its leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, as its head. This move has been deemed illegal by some political parties and analysts, as the TPLF lost its status as a legally registered political party and the regional parliament had been dissolved under the peace agreement, which aimed to restore federal authority and constitutional order in Tigray.
Further exacerbating tensions is the reported "totalitarian" legislation unveiled by the TPLF's self-proclaimed regional government. This draft proclamation allegedly seeks to impose mandatory military mobilization, expand security powers, establish a new media regulatory regime, and create a central command structure headed by the regional president. Such legislation has drawn fierce condemnation from opposition parties like Salsay Weyane Tigray (SAWET) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), who view it as an assault on judicial independence, fundamental rights, and a blueprint for totalitarian control, risking a reignition of conflict.
The transitional justice mechanisms, a cornerstone of the Pretoria Agreement, have also encountered significant hurdles. While Ethiopia adopted a national transitional justice policy in April 2024, criticisms persist regarding its inclusivity and the federal government's control over the process. Many stakeholders, particularly in Tigray, express skepticism about the impartiality of a process designed and controlled by a federal government accused of committing violations during the conflict. The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC), established in 2021 under Proclamation No. 1265/2021 to foster national consensus, has also faced criticism for its perceived lack of inclusivity and political bias, further complicating efforts to address long-standing political rifts through dialogue.
The recent drone strike in northwestern Tigray serves as a stark reminder of the ongoing military tensions and the fragile nature of the cessation of hostilities. These developments collectively indicate a significant deviation from the spirit and letter of the Pretoria Agreement, raising serious questions about the commitment of all parties to a peaceful resolution and the efficacy of existing legal and political frameworks to prevent a return to full-scale conflict. The legal implications are profound, as unilateral actions by regional entities that contradict a federally recognized peace agreement challenge the constitutional order and the very foundation of the peace process.
Conclusion
The current trajectory in northern Ethiopia, marked by renewed military posturing and controversial legislative actions, indicates a dangerous erosion of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. The African Union's continued engagement, exemplified by High Representative Obasanjo's recent visit, underscores the international community's recognition of the urgent need to salvage the peace process. However, for a lasting peace to take root, a mere cessation of hostilities is insufficient; a more comprehensive and genuinely inclusive political dialogue, akin to a "second Pretoria," is imperative.
Practitioners advising clients with interests in Ethiopia, particularly in the northern regions, must remain acutely aware of the volatile political and security landscape. The legal risks associated with investments, human rights compliance, and adherence to international humanitarian law are heightened by the potential for renewed conflict and the ambiguities surrounding regional governance. It is crucial to monitor the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, the progress and inclusivity of transitional justice mechanisms, and the effectiveness of the National Dialogue Commission. The international community, regional bodies, and all Ethiopian stakeholders must exert concerted pressure to ensure adherence to the principles of the Pretoria Agreement, foster genuine political will for dialogue, and prioritize the establishment of robust, impartial legal frameworks that can address grievances, ensure accountability, and ultimately prevent a return to the devastating cycle of war.
Citations
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