Constitutional Court to Hear Challenge to Mnangagwa's Removal of Majome As Human Rights Commission Chair

The Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe is poised to hear a significant challenge to President Emmerson Mnangagwa's decision to reassign Ms. Jessie Majome from her role as Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) to a Commissioner in the Public Service Commission (PSC). Filed by pro-democracy activist Allan Chipoyi, the application contends that the President's actions constitute an unconstitutional removal from office, bypassing the constitutionally mandated tribunal process for independent commissions. This case raises critical questions regarding the executive's powers, the security of tenure for members of Chapter 12 institutions, and the fundamental independence of bodies designed to uphold democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, particularly in light of the ZHRC's recent critical stance on proposed constitutional amendments.

The Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe is set to adjudicate a pivotal legal challenge that scrutinises the boundaries of presidential power and the enshrined independence of constitutional commissions. At the heart of the matter is President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s decision to reassign Ms. Jessie Majome from her position as Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) to a Commissioner within the Public Service Commission (PSC). This move has sparked a constitutional dispute, with pro-democracy activist Allan Chipoyi filing an application arguing that the reassignment amounts to an unlawful removal from office, circumventing the explicit procedures outlined in the Constitution for such actions.

This case, cited as *Allan Chipoyi v President of Zimbabwe*, Constitutional Court, case CCZ 29/26, carries profound implications for constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the perceived autonomy of independent institutions in Zimbabwe. The applicant contends that the President's actions undermine the constitutional safeguards intended to protect the independence and tenure of members of Chapter 12 institutions, thereby eroding public trust and potentially stifling critical oversight. The timing of Ms. Majome's reassignment, coming shortly after the ZHRC publicly criticised the consultation process for the controversial Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill (No. 3), further amplifies concerns about executive interference and potential reprisals against independent constitutional voices.

The central thesis of this article is that the Constitutional Court's ruling will be instrumental in defining the scope of presidential prerogative concerning appointments and removals within independent commissions, and in reaffirming or re-evaluating the practical independence of these vital democratic institutions under the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

The legal framework governing independent commissions in Zimbabwe is primarily enshrined in Chapter 12 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. These commissions, including the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, are established to support democracy and are mandated to promote, protect, and enforce human rights, among other functions. Section 235 of the Constitution explicitly guarantees the independence of these commissions, stating that they are not subject to the direction or control of anyone. Furthermore, Section 237 outlines the procedure for the appointment and removal of members of independent commissions, requiring nominations by Parliament's Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and, crucially, a formal process involving an independent tribunal for removal from office.

In contrast, the Public Service Commission (PSC) operates under a different constitutional mandate. Established by Section 202 of the Constitution, the PSC is an arm of the Executive, responsible for matters concerning the public service, including appointments, conditions of service, and disciplinary powers. While the President has broad powers of appointment to constitutional commissions and state institutions, these powers are subject to the specific provisions of the Constitution and relevant Acts of Parliament. The distinction between the independence of Chapter 12 institutions and the executive-aligned nature of the PSC is central to the current dispute.

Ms. Majome was appointed ZHRC Chairperson in March 2024. Her reassignment to the PSC on April 10, 2026, occurred shortly after the ZHRC issued a critical report on the public consultation process for the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill (No. 3), highlighting flaws and exclusionary practices. This timing has led to arguments that the reassignment was a retaliatory measure, further underscoring the perceived threat to the independence of the ZHRC.

The core of Allan Chipoyi's constitutional challenge rests on the argument that President Mnangagwa's reassignment of Ms. Majome constitutes a de facto removal from her position as ZHRC Chairperson, without adhering to the constitutionally prescribed removal procedures. Specifically, the application contends that the President failed to fulfil his constitutional obligations under Section 90(1) of the Constitution, which mandates the head of state to uphold, defend, obey, and respect the Constitution. The applicant further asserts that Sections 187 and 237(3) of the Constitution explicitly require the establishment of an independent tribunal to investigate and recommend the removal of members of independent commissions, a process that was not followed in this instance.

The Attorney-General, representing the President, has countered this argument by asserting that Ms. Majome was not 'removed' but merely 'reassigned,' implying that the stringent removal procedures do not apply. However, Chipoyi's legal team argues that such a distinction is a semantic attempt to bypass constitutional safeguards, and that an unconstitutional act cannot be sanitised or legitimised through repetition or re-labelling. This argument highlights the principle that illegality does not become lawful by repetition, challenging any reliance on past similar reassignments as precedent.

This case resonates with broader concerns about the independence of Chapter 12 institutions in Zimbabwe. Critics have often argued that these bodies, while constitutionally mandated to be independent, frequently face political interference and may act as proxies for political systems rather than truly autonomous entities. The outcome of this case will therefore be a crucial test of the Constitutional Court's resolve to protect the institutional integrity and functional independence of bodies like the ZHRC, which are vital for democratic accountability and human rights protection. International human rights bodies, including the United Nations, are also reportedly scrutinising the matter, raising concerns about potential violations of the Paris Principles, which govern the independence and functioning of national human rights institutions.

Comparative legal analysis often points to the robust independence of similar Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa, which have demonstrated a willingness to challenge government officials, including sitting presidents. The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court's decision will indicate whether its Chapter 12 institutions can similarly assert their autonomy against executive actions, thereby strengthening constitutionalism or potentially entrenching executive dominance over oversight bodies. The court's interpretation of 'removal' versus 'reassignment' will be critical in setting a precedent for the tenure and protection of commissioners in all independent commissions.

The impending hearing in the Constitutional Court concerning President Mnangagwa's reassignment of Ms. Jessie Majome is a landmark case with significant implications for constitutional governance in Zimbabwe. For legal practitioners, the judgment will provide crucial clarity on the interpretation of presidential powers regarding appointments and removals within independent commissions, particularly Sections 187 and 237 of the Constitution. It will define the practical scope of the 'independence' guaranteed to Chapter 12 institutions under Section 235, influencing how these bodies can operate without fear of executive reprisal.

Practitioners should closely monitor the Court's reasoning on the distinction between 'removal' and 'reassignment' and its impact on security of tenure. A ruling in favour of Chipoyi would reinforce constitutional safeguards and bolster the independence of oversight bodies, potentially encouraging greater assertiveness from these commissions. Conversely, a decision upholding the President's actions could be perceived as weakening institutional independence, necessitating a re-evaluation of strategies for challenging executive overreach. This case serves as a vital barometer for the health of Zimbabwe's constitutional democracy and the judiciary's role in upholding its foundational principles.