Constitutional safeguards will prevent state police abuse – Kalu

The ongoing debate in Nigeria regarding the establishment of state police has reached a critical juncture, with recent constitutional amendment bills passed by the National Assembly. Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu's assurance that robust constitutional safeguards will prevent abuse is central to assuaging public fears. This article examines the proposed legal and institutional frameworks designed to ensure accountability and prevent the political weaponisation of state police, drawing on existing constitutional provisions, the Police Act 2020, and the specifics of the new amendment bills. It delves into mechanisms such as independent oversight commissions, legislative review, and judicial intervention, while also acknowledging the historical concerns and practical challenges that necessitate these safeguards. The article provides legal professionals with an overview of the evolving landscape of policing in Nigeria and the critical role of constitutionalism in shaping its future.

Nigeria stands on the cusp of a significant transformation in its security architecture, with the National Assembly having recently passed constitutional amendment bills aimed at decentralising policing by establishing state police forces. This development, while widely seen as a potential solution to the nation's escalating security challenges, has simultaneously ignited fervent debate about the potential for abuse of power by state governors. Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu's recent assurances that constitutional safeguards are being put in place to prevent such abuses underscore the critical importance of robust legal frameworks in this impending paradigm shift.

The current centralised policing system, enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, has long been criticised for its inability to effectively address diverse local security threats across Nigeria's vast and heterogeneous landscape. Proponents argue that state police will enhance community policing, improve intelligence gathering, and ensure quicker response times. However, historical experiences and contemporary political realities fuel concerns that state police could become instruments of political intimidation, election manipulation, and human rights violations, reminiscent of the abuses by regional police forces in the First Republic.

This article critically examines the constitutional and statutory safeguards, both existing and proposed, that are intended to mitigate the risks associated with state policing in Nigeria. It analyses how these mechanisms aim to ensure accountability, transparency, and respect for fundamental human rights, providing legal practitioners with insights into the evolving legal landscape and the implications for governance and civil liberties.

Historically, Nigeria's policing structure has been predominantly centralised. Section 214(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), explicitly establishes a single Nigeria Police Force and prohibits the creation of any other police force for the Federation or any part thereof. The subject of police and policing is placed on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the National Assembly can legislate on it. This unitary control, a legacy of military rule, has been increasingly challenged by persistent insecurity, leading to widespread calls for a decentralised system that is more responsive to local needs.

The clamour for state police gained significant momentum due to the perceived ineffectiveness of the federal police in tackling issues like banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence. State governors, constitutionally designated as chief security officers of their states, often lament their lack of operational control over police commissioners deployed to their states. This disconnect has led to the emergence of informal state-backed security outfits, such as Amotekun in the South-West, operating in a legal grey area, further highlighting the urgent need for a formal constitutional framework.

In response, the Nigerian House of Representatives and the Senate have passed a constitutional amendment bill seeking to establish state police. This landmark legislative effort aims to substitute a new Section 214, creating both a Federal Police Service and, in each state, a State Police Service. For this amendment to become law, it requires ratification by at least two-thirds (24) of the 36 State Houses of Assembly, followed by presidential assent.

The proposed constitutional amendment bill introduces several critical safeguards designed to prevent the abuse of state police powers. A key provision explicitly prohibits any governor from directing a state police service to unlawfully target specific persons, political parties, groups, or associations. This aims to address the historical fear of political weaponisation, a primary concern stemming from the First Republic's experience with regional police.

Furthermore, the bill outlines a structured appointment process for State Police Commissioners. While governors are empowered to appoint these commissioners, the appointment is not absolute; it requires involvement from the National Police Council and confirmation by the State House of Assembly. Crucially, a mechanism is proposed where a Commissioner of Police can refer a governor's instruction that is believed to violate policing standards or the law to the National Police Council for a binding review, acting as a vital check against executive overreach.

To ensure uniformity and professionalism, the National Assembly is mandated to prescribe national minimum standards applicable to both federal and state police services. These standards will cover critical areas such as recruitment, vetting, training, certification, appointment, promotion, discipline, conduct, use of force, firearms, custody, complaints, and accountability. State legislatures, however, retain the power to enact laws prescribing higher or additional standards, provided they do not derogate from the national minimums. The establishment of independent State Police Service Commissions, mirroring the existing Police Service Commission at the federal level, is also a cornerstone of the proposed framework, tasked with overseeing recruitment, promotions, and discipline, thereby insulating these processes from direct political interference.

Beyond these specific provisions, Nigeria's existing legal framework offers broader constitutional safeguards. Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights, including the right to life, dignity of the person, personal liberty, and fair hearing, which serve as inherent limitations on police powers. The Police Act 2020, a significant reform, introduced enforceable rights, strict timelines for detention, and formal accountability mechanisms, mandating police officers to uphold the Constitution and protect fundamental rights. Judicial review remains a potent tool, allowing courts to scrutinise administrative actions, including those of the police, to ensure adherence to legal limits and prevent abuse of discretionary powers. Recent rulings, such as the affirmation of citizens' right to film police officers on duty, further strengthen judicial oversight and promote transparency.

Despite these proposed and existing safeguards, challenges persist. Concerns about adequate funding for state police, potential role conflicts with the federal police, and the capacity of state institutions to resist political manipulation remain prominent. The effectiveness of these safeguards will ultimately depend on their rigorous implementation, the independence of oversight bodies, and the vigilance of the judiciary and civil society. The ongoing constitutional amendment process, therefore, represents a delicate balancing act between decentralising security for greater effectiveness and ensuring that such devolution does not lead to a 'police state' at the sub-national level.

The move towards state policing in Nigeria, while a necessary response to the country's complex security challenges, is fraught with the risk of power abuse. Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu's emphasis on constitutional safeguards highlights the recognition of these inherent dangers. The proposed constitutional amendments, by introducing independent State Police Service Commissions, legislative oversight, and mechanisms for challenging unlawful directives, aim to build a robust framework for accountability. These new provisions, coupled with existing constitutional guarantees of fundamental human rights and the procedural safeguards embedded in the Police Act 2020, offer a multi-layered approach to preventing abuse.

For legal practitioners, this evolving landscape presents both challenges and opportunities. Advising clients on their rights in interactions with both federal and state police, engaging in public interest litigation to enforce accountability, and monitoring the implementation of the new policing architecture will be crucial. Attorneys must remain vigilant regarding the operational independence of the proposed State Police Service Commissions and the effectiveness of judicial review in practice. The success of state policing in Nigeria will not solely depend on its establishment, but critically on the unwavering commitment to these constitutional and institutional safeguards, ensuring that enhanced security does not come at the expense of civil liberties and democratic principles. The coming months, as the bill progresses through state assemblies and towards presidential assent, will be pivotal in shaping the future of law enforcement and human rights protection in Nigeria.