Family Court names expert who only “skimmed” the paperwork

A recent decision in the Family Court, *Re H (A Child: Expert Witness)* [2024] EWFC 17, saw a judge take the unusual step of naming an expert witness who had provided evidence deemed to be significantly deficient. The expert, a consultant paediatrician, admitted to having only “skimmed” crucial paperwork, leading to multiple shortcomings in their report concerning the death of a two-year-old girl. This case underscores the Family Court's increasing emphasis on transparency and the stringent duties owed by expert witnesses to the court, reinforcing that their primary role is to assist the court impartially and thoroughly. The judgment serves as a stark reminder to legal professionals and experts alike of the high standards required in family proceedings, particularly those involving vulnerable children.

The integrity of expert evidence is a cornerstone of justice, particularly within the sensitive and often complex landscape of Family Court proceedings. A recent judgment, *Re H (A Child: Expert Witness)* [2024] EWFC 17, has sent a clear message regarding the exacting standards expected of expert witnesses. In this case, a Family Court judge publicly identified a consultant paediatrician whose evidence was found to be severely lacking, notably due to the expert admitting to having merely “skimmed” critical documentation related to the death of a two-year-old girl.

This decision is not merely a critique of an individual expert but a significant development in the ongoing drive for transparency and accountability within the family justice system. It highlights the profound implications of inadequate expert evidence, especially in cases concerning the welfare of children, where judicial decisions can have life-altering consequences. The case serves as a crucial reminder for legal practitioners to meticulously vet and instruct experts, and for experts themselves to adhere rigorously to their professional and ethical duties to the court.

This article will delve into the background of expert evidence in Family Court, analyse the specific failings in *Re H*, and discuss the broader implications for practitioners and the future of expert witness engagement, particularly in light of recent and upcoming regulatory changes aimed at enhancing the quality and reliability of expert testimony.

The framework governing expert evidence in family proceedings in England and Wales is primarily set out in Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) and its accompanying Practice Direction 25B. A fundamental principle enshrined in Rule 25.3 is that an expert's overriding duty is to the court, not to the party instructing or paying them. This duty mandates objectivity, impartiality, and the provision of opinions strictly within the expert's area of expertise, with clear explanations of their reasoning and engagement with any contrary views.

Furthermore, the court's permission is required before any expert can be instructed or their report put into evidence. This permission is granted only where the expert evidence is deemed “necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings justly,” a higher threshold than in civil proceedings, introduced by Section 13(6) of the Children and Families Act 2014. Practice Direction 25B specifies the detailed content requirements for expert reports, ensuring they are comprehensive, transparent, and capable of thorough scrutiny.

The issue of naming expert witnesses in Family Court judgments has also evolved significantly, driven by a push for greater transparency. Historically, there was a tendency towards anonymisation, but senior judiciary, including former Presidents of the Family Division, Lord Justice Munby and Sir Nicholas Wall, have consistently advocated for the routine disclosure of experts' names and reports. This shift reflects the public interest in open justice and the accountability of those whose evidence profoundly impacts the lives of families and children.

In *Re H (A Child: Expert Witness)* [2024] EWFC 17, the consultant paediatrician's admission to merely “skimming” the paperwork represented a fundamental breach of the duties outlined in FPR Part 25 and Practice Direction 25B. An expert's duty to the court necessitates a thorough and meticulous review of all relevant materials to form a robust and well-reasoned opinion. Superficial engagement with evidence undermines the expert's impartiality and the reliability of their conclusions, directly impeding the court's ability to resolve the proceedings justly, particularly in a case involving the tragic death of a child. Such conduct directly contravenes the requirement for experts to explain the basis for their reasoning and to engage with all relevant facts.

The judge's decision to name the expert, despite the expert's preference for anonymity, aligns with the broader judicial trend towards increased transparency in the Family Court. This principle, championed by figures such as Lord Justice Munby, asserts that the public interest in knowing the identities of experts giving evidence in care cases outweighs concerns about potential vilification or a reluctance of professionals to undertake such work. The rationale is that open identification fosters accountability and allows for informed debate about the quality and content of expert evidence, thereby strengthening public confidence in the family justice system.

The shortcomings in *Re H* highlight the critical need for experts to possess not only the requisite expertise but also a profound understanding of their procedural obligations. Poor quality expert evidence can lead to significant delays, unnecessary costs, and, most critically, a miscarriage of justice for vulnerable children and families. The case serves as a stark illustration of why the court must be satisfied that an expert has the necessary knowledge, experience, and impartiality, and that their evidence is underpinned by a reliable body of knowledge.

Looking ahead, the Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2026, set to come into force on 20 July 2026, will further tighten the regulation of expert witnesses in children proceedings. These amendments will restrict expert evidence to “regulated experts” – those regulated by a UK statutory body, on a Professional Standards Authority accredited register, or regulated by an approved Legal Services Act 2007 regulator. This legislative development directly addresses concerns about the quality and qualifications of experts, aiming to prevent situations like that in *Re H* by ensuring a higher baseline standard for all expert evidence presented in children cases.

The judgment in *Re H (A Child: Expert Witness)* [2024] EWFC 17 serves as a potent reminder to all legal practitioners and expert witnesses of the critical importance of meticulous preparation, unwavering impartiality, and strict adherence to procedural rules in Family Court proceedings. The naming of the expert underscores the judiciary's commitment to transparency and accountability, particularly where the welfare of children is at stake. Experts must understand that their overriding duty is to the court, demanding thoroughness that goes far beyond merely “skimming” vital documents.

For practitioners, this case reinforces the necessity of diligently instructing and managing expert witnesses, ensuring they are fully aware of their duties under FPR Part 25 and Practice Direction 25B. The upcoming Family Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2026 will further professionalise the field by limiting expert evidence in children proceedings to regulated professionals, necessitating careful checks on an expert's accreditation and qualifications. As the family justice system continues its evolution towards greater transparency and higher standards, both legal professionals and experts must remain vigilant to ensure that the evidence presented is always of the highest calibre, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process and, most importantly, the best interests of the children involved.