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From Constitutionalist To Constitutional Coup: The Unravelling Of Mnangagwa’s Promise

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Abstract

President Emmerson Mnangagwa's public commitment in February 2025 to adhere to a two-term presidential limit has been significantly undermined by the recent enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, 2026. This amendment extends the presidential term from five to seven years and alters the mode of presidential election from direct popular vote to parliamentary selection. Crucially, the Act explicitly applies these extended terms to the incumbent, potentially allowing President Mnangagwa to remain in office until 2030, contrary to his earlier promise and the spirit of the 2013 Constitution's term-limit provisions. This development raises profound questions about constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the integrity of democratic processes in Zimbabwe, particularly concerning the 'no-benefit rule' enshrined in Section 328(7) of the Constitution, which prohibits term-limit extensions from applying to sitting office holders without a national referendum.

Introduction

In February 2025, President Emmerson Mnangagwa made a public declaration at State House, assuring editors and the nation that he was a "constitutionalist" and would step aside after serving his two definite terms, allowing his party to elect a successor. This promise resonated as a commitment to democratic principles and constitutional adherence, particularly in a region where presidential term limits are often challenged. However, recent legislative developments in Zimbabwe have cast a long shadow over this pledge, leading to widespread concerns of a potential "constitutional coup" and an unravelling of the nation's democratic fabric.

The enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, 2026, represents a significant departure from the constitutional framework established in 2013. This article examines the legal implications of this amendment, focusing on its impact on presidential term limits, the principle of constitutionalism, and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. It will delve into the specific provisions of the amendment, juxtaposing them with the original constitutional safeguards and exploring the contentious issue of its application to the incumbent President, thereby analyzing the challenges posed to the nation's democratic trajectory.

Background

The Constitution of Zimbabwe, adopted in 2013, was widely hailed for introducing progressive provisions aimed at strengthening democratic governance and limiting executive power. Central to these reforms were the explicit presidential term limits. Section 91(2) of the Constitution unequivocally states that a person is disqualified for election as President if they have already held office for two terms, whether continuous or not, with three or more years of service deemed a full term. Furthermore, Section 95(2) stipulated that the President's term of office is five years, coterminous with the life of Parliament.

Prior to the latest changes, Zimbabwe had already seen two significant constitutional amendments since 2013. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Act, 2017, controversially altered the procedure for appointing the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice, and Judge President of the High Court, granting the President greater discretion and removing the requirement for public interviews. Subsequently, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act, 2021, introduced further changes, including the removal of the presidential running mate clause, alterations to judicial tenure, and the appointment of judges, which critics argued further concentrated power in the executive and eroded judicial independence. These earlier amendments set a precedent for executive-led constitutional changes, laying the groundwork for the more far-reaching alterations now introduced concerning presidential tenure.

Analysis

The recently enacted Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, 2026 (CAB3), introduces two fundamental changes to the presidential office. Firstly, it extends the presidential term from five years to seven years. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, it abolishes direct popular election of the President, replacing it with an election by a joint sitting of Parliament. These amendments, signed into law by President Mnangagwa on July 7, 2026, explicitly state that the new term lengths apply to current office bearers. This means President Mnangagwa's second term, originally set to conclude in 2028, is now extended until 2030.

The application of these extended terms to the incumbent directly conflicts with Section 328(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, a critical safeguard often referred to as the "no-benefit rule." This section unequivocally states that "an amendment to a term-limit provision, the effect of which is to extend the length of time that a person may hold or occupy any public office, does not apply in relation to any person who held or occupied that office, or an equivalent office, at any time before the amendment." Legal experts and civil society organisations have consistently highlighted that any amendment extending a term limit for an incumbent would necessitate a national referendum, as per Section 328(9), which governs amendments to entrenched provisions like term limits.

Despite these constitutional provisions, the government has maintained that CAB3 did not amend any protected provisions and therefore did not require a referendum. This interpretation has been widely criticised as a circumvention of constitutional safeguards designed to prevent indefinite rule and uphold popular sovereignty. The shift from direct popular election to parliamentary election of the President further entrenches executive power and diminishes democratic accountability, as it removes the direct mandate from the electorate. Critics have labelled these changes a "constitutional coup," arguing that they fundamentally undermine the founding values of the 2013 Constitution, including the separation of powers, constitutionalism, and the rule of law.

The role of the Constitutional Court in this unfolding scenario is paramount. While a High Court ruling previously dismissed a challenge against the proposed amendments, the Constitutional Court is now expected to adjudicate on the constitutionality of CAB3, particularly concerning the application of Section 328(7). The Court's decision will be a critical test of judicial independence and its commitment to upholding the supreme law of the land against executive overreach. The implications extend beyond presidential tenure, impacting the integrity of the judiciary, the legislative process, and the overall democratic trajectory of Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The journey from President Mnangagwa's promise of constitutional adherence to the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, 2026, marks a concerning trajectory for constitutionalism and democratic governance in Zimbabwe. The extension of presidential terms and the shift to parliamentary election, particularly its application to the incumbent, directly challenge the foundational principles and explicit safeguards enshrined in the 2013 Constitution. The apparent disregard for Section 328(7) and the potential sidestepping of a national referendum underscore a worrying trend towards the concentration of executive power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances.

For legal practitioners, this development necessitates heightened vigilance and a deep understanding of constitutional law. The legal community will be instrumental in advocating for the preservation of constitutional integrity, potentially through further litigation challenging the validity and application of these amendments. Practitioners must be prepared to advise clients on the evolving legal landscape, particularly concerning electoral processes and the interpretation of constitutional provisions. The ultimate resolution of this constitutional dilemma will depend significantly on the Constitutional Court's willingness to uphold the supreme law and safeguard the democratic aspirations of the Zimbabwean people. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether Zimbabwe reaffirms its commitment to constitutionalism or continues down a path of executive dominance.

Citations

  1. 1.Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013
  2. 2.Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Act, 2017 (Act No. 10 of 2017)
  3. 3.Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act, 2021 (Act No. 2 of 2021)
  4. 4.Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, 2026
From Constitutionalist To Constitutional Coup: The Unravelling Of Mnangagwa’s Promise — Briefly | Briefly