Luther C. Parente v. Nelson Lefebvre, in his official capacity as Warden of the Department of Corrections

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in *Luther C. Parente et al. v. Nelson Lefebvre*, clarified a critical aspect of state sovereign immunity, holding that discrimination claims brought under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) are considered “actions of tort” under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA). This landmark decision, issued in response to a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirms that the State of Rhode Island has waived its sovereign immunity for such claims, thereby allowing individuals to seek damages against the state for civil rights violations. The ruling provides essential clarity for practitioners navigating civil rights litigation against state entities in Rhode Island, reinforcing the state's commitment to accountability for discriminatory acts.

In a significant ruling that bolsters civil rights protections in Rhode Island, the state's highest court has definitively classified discrimination claims under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) as “actions of tort.” The decision, *Luther C. Parente et al. v. Nelson Lefebvre, in his official capacity as Warden of the Department of Corrections, et al.*, Supreme Court No. 2024-387-M.P. (R.I. July 3, 2026), resolves a crucial question of state sovereign immunity that had been certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This determination means that the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained within the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) extends to RICRA claims, allowing individuals to pursue damages against the state for alleged discriminatory conduct.

The case originated from a federal lawsuit filed by incarcerated individuals alleging disability discrimination and inadequate medical care by the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC). The core legal dispute centered on whether the state could invoke sovereign immunity to shield itself from liability under RICRA. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's affirmative answer to the certified question not only clarifies the scope of the STCA but also significantly impacts the landscape of civil rights litigation against state actors and entities within the jurisdiction.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally protects states from lawsuits unless they have expressly waived that immunity. In Rhode Island, the primary mechanism for waiving sovereign immunity is the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1(a), which broadly waives immunity for “all actions of tort.” The Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 to -2, provides a state-level avenue for individuals to seek redress for civil rights violations, often mirroring federal civil rights statutes. However, the precise classification of RICRA claims – specifically, whether they constitute “actions of tort” for the purpose of the STCA's waiver – had not been definitively settled by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

The underlying federal litigation involved Luther C. Parente and Eric L. Stewart, inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions, who sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and its staff. They alleged, among other claims, that RIDOC failed to properly treat their preexisting ankle injuries and denied them necessary accommodations, constituting disability discrimination under RICRA. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied RIDOC's motion for summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment grounds concerning the RICRA claim, reasoning that RICRA actions sounded in tort and were therefore subject to the STCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. This decision was appealed to the First Circuit, which, recognizing the unsettled nature of the state law question, certified it to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its July 3, 2026 opinion, meticulously analyzed whether discrimination claims under RICRA fall within the ambit of “actions of tort” as defined by the STCA. The Court began by examining the plain language of the STCA and Rhode Island's expansive definition of “tort,” as articulated in recent precedent such as *Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon*, 312 A.3d 475 (R.I. 2024). It concluded that a RICRA discrimination claim aligns comfortably with tort principles because the statute establishes a legal duty and authorizes damages for injuries resulting from a wrongful breach of that duty.

Furthermore, the Court found its conclusion to be consistent with federal jurisprudence, particularly citing *Curtis v. Loether*, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), where the U.S. Supreme Court characterized federal civil rights damages claims as “basically in tort.” The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that when RICRA was enacted, modeled on federal civil rights statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1981, federal precedent already treated discrimination claims as akin to civil injuries sounding in tort. This historical context and comparative analysis reinforced the Court's interpretation that RICRA claims fit the tort classification.

The Court rejected arguments for a categorical avoidance of classifying RICRA claims as torts, emphasizing that the alleged discrimination, such as the failure to provide appropriate care and accommodations for incarcerated individuals, is analogous to traditional torts like negligence or medical malpractice. By affirming that RICRA claims are “actions of tort,” the Rhode Island Supreme Court effectively confirmed that the state's general waiver of sovereign immunity under the STCA applies, thereby allowing individuals to seek monetary damages for civil rights violations committed by state entities. This decision aligns with the broader purpose of civil rights legislation to provide effective remedies for those whose rights have been infringed.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in *Parente v. Lefebvre* provides much-needed clarity for attorneys practicing civil rights law in the state. Practitioners can now confidently assert that claims for discrimination under RICRA are subject to the State Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, opening the door for damages claims against state actors and agencies. This ruling is a significant victory for civil rights advocates, ensuring that the state cannot easily evade accountability for discriminatory practices by invoking sovereign immunity.

Attorneys representing clients alleging civil rights violations by state entities in Rhode Island should review this decision carefully, as it solidifies a critical avenue for redress. The case now returns to the First Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Rhode Island Supreme Court's answer to the certified question. Legal professionals should monitor the federal proceedings for any further developments, but the fundamental question of state sovereign immunity for RICRA claims has been definitively resolved, reinforcing the principle that state government, like other actors, must adhere to civil rights protections.