Briefly

“No Citizen Has Seen State Police Bills” — Odinkalu Demands Public Scrutiny, Says Governors Want Police Control Ahead Of Elections

Legal NewsNigeria·The Nigerian Lawyer·Briefly Analysis

Abstract

The ongoing push for state police in Nigeria, aimed at addressing escalating insecurity, faces significant scrutiny from legal experts. Professor Chidi Odinkalu, former Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, has voiced strong concerns that the proposal, as currently handled, risks transforming policing power into a political instrument for state governors, particularly with elections approaching. He highlights the alarming lack of public scrutiny of the proposed bills, noting that citizens have not seen or participated in reviewing the different versions before the National Assembly. This article delves into the constitutional implications, potential for abuse, and the critical need for robust safeguards and public participation to ensure state policing serves justice and security rather than political interests.

Introduction

Nigeria is currently grappling with a severe and multifaceted security crisis, ranging from banditry and kidnappings to communal violence and insurgency, which has severely stretched the capabilities of the centralised Nigeria Police Force. This escalating insecurity has intensified calls for the establishment of state police, with a broad consensus emerging among various stakeholders on the need for a decentralised policing structure. However, this critical reform initiative is not without its complexities and potential pitfalls, as highlighted by prominent legal voices.

Professor Chidi Odinkalu, a former Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, has emerged as a leading voice of caution, expressing significant reservations about the current trajectory of the state police debate. He warns that the manner in which the proposal is being advanced, particularly the lack of public access to the draft legislation, risks turning state policing into a tool for political manipulation by state governors, especially in the run-up to elections. This article will explore the legal and constitutional framework surrounding policing in Nigeria, analyse the concerns raised by Professor Odinkalu, and examine the critical safeguards necessary to ensure that the establishment of state police genuinely enhances security and upholds democratic principles.

Background

The current policing architecture in Nigeria is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Section 214(1) unequivocally states, "There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section, no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof." This provision establishes a unitary, federally controlled police force with exclusive jurisdiction throughout the country, a structure inherited from the colonial era.

Calls for state police are not new, having been a recurring feature of Nigeria's political discourse since its return to democratic rule, driven by arguments for true federalism and the perceived inadequacy of a centralised force to address localised security threats. The operations of the Nigeria Police Force are further governed by the Nigeria Police Act 2020, which repealed the earlier Police Act Cap. P19, Laws of the Federation, 2004, aiming to provide a more effective and accountable police force. Additionally, the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act 2001 establishes an oversight body responsible for the appointment, promotion, and disciplinary control of police officers, excluding the Inspector-General of Police. Any move to establish state police, therefore, necessitates a fundamental constitutional amendment, specifically altering Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution.

Analysis

The proposed shift to state policing fundamentally implicates Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution, which currently places policing on the Exclusive Legislative List, thereby vesting control solely in the Federal Government. Recent legislative efforts, including bills passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, aim to amend this section to allow for a two-tier policing structure, comprising a Federal Police and State Police, operating under a nationally regulated framework. The Federal Police would retain nationwide reach for national security and interstate crimes, while State Police would focus on local law enforcement and community security.

Professor Chidi Odinkalu's critique centres on several critical concerns. Firstly, he warns that the proposal, if not carefully managed, could lead to the weaponisation of state police by governors for political ends, particularly during election cycles. He draws parallels to the historical abuses of the Native Authority Police during the colonial era, which were often used to suppress political opponents. Secondly, Odinkalu expresses alarm over the lack of public scrutiny and participation in the legislative process, noting that citizens have not seen the different versions of the state police bills currently before the National Assembly. This opacity undermines democratic principles and public trust in a reform of such national significance.

Furthermore, Odinkalu argues that police reform cannot be divorced from broader justice system reforms. He questions the commitment of governors to justice, citing their alleged underfunding of state ministries of justice, suggesting that their eagerness for police control might be more about political leverage than genuine law enforcement or justice delivery. This raises concerns about the potential for uneven policing across states, with financially buoyant states possibly establishing more effective forces than less resourced ones. While proponents argue that decentralisation will improve intelligence gathering and response times, critics fear that without robust safeguards, state police could be used to intimidate opposition, suppress dissent, and interfere with democratic processes.

The proposed constitutional amendments attempt to address some of these concerns by including safeguards. These include provisions for the appointment of state police commissioners by governors, subject to the involvement of the National Police Council and confirmation by the State House of Assembly. The bills also reportedly provide for mechanisms to refer unlawful directives from governors to the National Police Council for review, with its decision being binding. Additionally, federal intervention in state policing matters is envisioned only under exceptional circumstances, such as a breakdown of public order or the inability of state police to function. However, the effectiveness of these safeguards in practice, particularly in a politically charged environment, remains a key point of contention.

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the establishment of state police in Nigeria represents a critical juncture in the nation's quest for enhanced security and true federalism. While the need for a decentralised policing system is widely acknowledged as a necessary response to pervasive insecurity, the warnings from Professor Chidi Odinkalu underscore the profound risks associated with its implementation without adequate transparency and robust safeguards. The potential for state police to be weaponised for political gain, particularly in an electoral context, is a legitimate concern that demands meticulous legislative and public attention.

For legal practitioners, the ongoing constitutional amendment process presents significant implications across various fields, including constitutional law, human rights law, and electoral law. Attorneys must closely monitor the finalisation of the legislative framework, paying particular attention to the checks and balances designed to prevent abuse of power, ensure accountability, and protect fundamental rights. The success of state policing will ultimately hinge on the development of clear, enforceable legal provisions that guarantee operational independence, adequate funding, and genuine public oversight, thereby ensuring that this crucial reform serves the collective security and justice interests of all Nigerians, rather than becoming a tool for political oppression. Public participation and sustained vigilance remain paramount to shaping a policing system that is truly responsive and accountable to the citizenry.

Citations

  1. 1.1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)
  2. 2.Nigeria Police Act 2020
  3. 3.Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act 2001
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