Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation

The Eleventh Circuit, in its unpublished *per curiam* opinion in *Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation*, affirmed the dismissal of a passenger's state-law negligence claim against JetBlue. The plaintiff alleged he was negligently placed on the airline's "uninvited-to-fly list" in violation of Florida tort law. The appellate court held that the claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), specifically 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), which broadly preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." This decision reinforces the expansive scope of federal preemption in the aviation industry, particularly concerning an airline's fundamental control over who it transports, and serves as a reminder to practitioners of the significant hurdles state-law claims face against air carriers.

The landscape of aviation litigation is frequently shaped by the expansive reach of federal preemption, a doctrine that often limits the applicability of state-law claims against air carriers. A recent, albeit unpublished, decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, *Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation*, No. 25-10989, underscores this critical principle. The case involved a passenger's state-law negligence claim stemming from his placement on JetBlue's "uninvited-to-fly list," a decision that effectively denied him future access to the airline's services.

This ruling, issued as a *per curiam* opinion, affirmed the district court's dismissal of Figueroa's claim, finding it preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). While not binding precedent, the decision offers valuable insight into the Eleventh Circuit's consistent application of ADA preemption to matters touching upon an airline's core operational services. For legal professionals, understanding the boundaries of this preemption is paramount when advising clients, whether they are passengers seeking redress or air carriers defending against state-law challenges.

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), codified in part at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), was enacted to promote efficiency, innovation, and low prices in the airline industry by reducing federal regulation and fostering competition. A cornerstone of this legislative scheme is its express preemption provision, which states that a "State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier."

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this preemption provision broadly. In *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 504 U.S. 374 (1992), the Court held that the phrase "related to" means having a "connection with or reference to" airline prices, routes, or services. This expansive interpretation was reaffirmed in *Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg*, 572 U.S. 273 (2014), where the Court clarified that state common-law rules fall "comfortably within the language of the ADA pre-emption provision." The Eleventh Circuit has similarly adopted a broad view, defining "services of an air carrier" as "a bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor" from the air carrier to the passenger, including "the transportation itself." *Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.*, 342 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2003).

It is important to note that the *Figueroa* opinion is designated "NOT FOR PUBLICATION." In the Eleventh Circuit, such opinions are not considered binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority, provided a copy is attached to or incorporated within the brief, petition, or motion. This status indicates that the court found the case did not establish new law or alter existing precedent, but rather applied established legal principles to the facts presented.

In *Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation*, the plaintiff, Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa, brought a state-law negligence claim against JetBlue, alleging that the airline negligently placed him on its "uninvited-to-fly list" in violation of Florida tort law. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that it was preempted by the ADA, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this dismissal.

The Eleventh Circuit's analysis hinged on two key determinations consistent with Supreme Court and circuit precedent. First, the court reiterated that Florida's common law of negligence constitutes a "law" within the meaning of the ADA's preemption provision, citing *Ginsberg*. This confirms that the ADA's preemptive scope extends beyond state statutes and regulations to encompass common-law causes of action. Second, the court found that Figueroa's negligence claim was "related to . . . [the] service of an air carrier" under 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b). The court reasoned that when JetBlue placed Figueroa on its uninvited-to-fly list, it was denying him access to its transportation services, which are a core component of an air carrier's "services."

Notably, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Figueroa's claim from a "wrongful removal" claim, such as the one discussed in *Xiaoyun Lucy Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc.*, 631 F. App'x 657 (11th Cir. 2015). In *Lu*, the court commented in *dicta* that a claim arising from a passenger's "wrongful removal" from a flight *before take-off*—after having acquired a ticket and boarded the plane—was not related to a service under the ADA. Figueroa, however, sought relief for the *decision* to place him on the uninvited-to-fly list, which directly impacted his ability to *access* future transportation services, rather than a specific incident during an already-commenced flight. This distinction is crucial, as it clarifies that claims challenging an airline's fundamental decisions about who it will transport fall squarely within the preempted realm of "services."

This decision reinforces the broad protection afforded to airlines under the ADA against state-law challenges to their core operational decisions. While the ADA's preemption is extensive, it is not absolute. For instance, the Supreme Court in *American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens*, 513 U.S. 219 (1995), carved out a narrow exception for claims seeking to enforce the "self-imposed contractual obligations" of an airline, such as those arising from a breach of contract of carriage. The Eleventh Circuit has applied this exception, for example, in cases involving undisclosed fees. However, *Figueroa* demonstrates that state-law tort claims, particularly those challenging an airline's discretion in providing or denying its fundamental transportation services, are highly susceptible to preemption.

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa v. JetBlue Airways Corporation* serves as a stark reminder of the potent force of federal preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act. By affirming the dismissal of a state-law negligence claim related to an airline's "uninvited-to-fly list," the court reinforces that an air carrier's fundamental decisions regarding who it will transport are considered integral to its "services" and are therefore shielded from state-law interference.

For practitioners, this case underscores the necessity of a thorough preemption analysis when evaluating potential claims against airlines. Plaintiffs contemplating state-law tort actions must carefully assess whether their claims directly or indirectly relate to an airline's prices, routes, or services, as such claims are likely to be preempted. Conversely, air carriers can rely on the ADA's broad preemptive scope as a robust defense against state-law challenges to their operational decisions, particularly those concerning passenger access and eligibility. While this unpublished opinion does not set new binding precedent, it clearly illustrates the Eleventh Circuit's consistent application of established preemption principles, guiding future litigation in this complex area of law.