Santiago-Santiago

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently issued a significant precedential decision in *Matter of Catalina Santiago-Santiago*, holding that an Immigration Judge (IJ) erred in terminating removal proceedings solely because the respondent had been granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The BIA clarified that while DACA status is a relevant factor, it is not, by itself, a dispositive ground for termination. Immigration Judges must consider the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) reasons for opposing termination, reinforcing the discretionary nature of both deferred action and the termination of removal proceedings. This ruling underscores the BIA's stance on the limited scope of an IJ's authority to terminate proceedings over government objection, particularly when a noncitizen holds a temporary, discretionary benefit like DACA.

In a pivotal ruling for immigration practitioners, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided *Matter of Catalina Santiago-Santiago*, 29 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2026), on April 24, 2026, clarifying the interplay between Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status and the termination of removal proceedings. The BIA held that an Immigration Judge (IJ) improperly terminated removal proceedings based *solely* on the respondent's DACA status, without adequately considering the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) opposition.

This decision carries substantial implications for DACA recipients currently in removal proceedings and for immigration attorneys advising such clients. It signals a tightening of the grounds upon which IJs may exercise their discretion to terminate cases, emphasizing that DACA, while a significant form of prosecutorial discretion, does not automatically shield individuals from the full litigation of their removability. The ruling reinforces the principle that deferred action is a temporary reprieve, not a grant of lawful status or an absolute bar to removal proceedings.

This article will delve into the BIA's reasoning in *Santiago-Santiago*, examine the legal framework surrounding deferred action and termination of removal proceedings, and discuss the practical consequences for legal professionals navigating these complex immigration matters.

Deferred action, notably exemplified by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program established in 2012, is a discretionary determination by DHS to defer removal action against an individual for a specified period. It does not confer lawful immigration status, nor does it provide a pathway to permanent residency or citizenship. Instead, it offers temporary protection from deportation and, for eligible individuals, the ability to obtain work authorization. Deferred action is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, a power held by immigration officials (ICE, USCIS, CBP) to decide whether and how to enforce immigration laws.

Removal proceedings are initiated by DHS through a Notice to Appear (NTA) and are adjudicated by Immigration Judges within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). IJs have the authority to terminate removal proceedings under specific circumstances, as outlined in regulations such as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18. Historically, termination could occur for various reasons, including prosecutorial discretion by DHS, defects in the NTA, or eligibility for other forms of relief. However, the BIA has previously held that IJs generally cannot review the wisdom of DHS's decision to initiate proceedings. The *Santiago-Santiago* case arose when an Immigration Judge terminated the removal proceedings of Catalina Santiago-Santiago, a DACA recipient charged with being present without admission or parole under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), solely based on her DACA status and alleged prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status through marriage to a U.S. citizen. DHS appealed this termination, arguing that DACA does not create a right to remain in the U.S. or bar removal proceedings.

The BIA, in *Matter of Santiago-Santiago*, sustained DHS's appeal and remanded the case, unequivocally stating that an Immigration Judge errs by terminating removal proceedings based *solely* on a respondent’s DACA status without considering the government’s opposition. The Board reviewed the IJ's decision de novo, as is its prerogative for issues of law, discretion, or judgment under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026). While 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(C) (2026) does list beneficiaries of deferred action as a category for whom discretionary termination may be considered, the BIA emphasized that this provision does not mandate termination.

The core of the BIA's analysis rests on the distinction between prosecutorial discretion and judicial discretion. Deferred action, including DACA, is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by DHS. It is a temporary administrative grace, not a statutory form of relief from removal, nor does it confer lawful status. DHS retains the authority to initiate or continue removal proceedings even against individuals with deferred action. The BIA found that the IJ's decision to terminate based *only* on DACA status effectively usurped DHS's prosecutorial discretion and failed to acknowledge the government's legitimate interest in pursuing removal proceedings.

Furthermore, the BIA highlighted that the IJ failed to consider the reasons for DHS's opposition to termination. DHS had argued that DACA does not confer any right to remain in the United States and noted the absence of a pending immigrant visa petition for the respondent. This omission by the IJ was a critical error, as proper exercise of discretion requires a balanced consideration of all relevant factors, including the government's position. The BIA's ruling aligns with its broader jurisprudence that IJs should not unduly interfere with DHS's enforcement priorities unless specifically authorized by statute or regulation.

This decision also implicitly distinguishes between termination and administrative closure. While administrative closure temporarily removes a case from an IJ's active calendar, it does not definitively end proceedings and can be reopened. Termination, on the other hand, concludes the proceedings. The BIA's ruling underscores that even with a grant of deferred action, a respondent in removal proceedings must still demonstrate compelling reasons for termination, and the IJ must weigh these against any government opposition, rather than treating DACA as an automatic basis for closure.

The BIA's decision in *Matter of Santiago-Santiago* serves as a crucial reminder to immigration practitioners that DACA status, while providing temporary protection and work authorization, does not automatically lead to the termination of removal proceedings. Attorneys representing DACA recipients in removal proceedings must understand that an Immigration Judge cannot terminate a case solely on this basis, especially when DHS actively opposes such a motion.

Practitioners should be prepared to present additional compelling equities and legal arguments beyond mere DACA status when seeking termination. It is essential to thoroughly address and counter DHS's stated reasons for continuing proceedings, and to explore other forms of relief for which the client may be eligible. This ruling reinforces the discretionary nature of immigration benefits and the importance of a comprehensive strategy that accounts for both prosecutorial discretion and judicial review. Moving forward, attorneys should anticipate that IJs will scrutinize motions to terminate more closely, requiring a robust showing that termination is warranted under the totality of the circumstances and not just based on a temporary grant of deferred action.