Briefly

State police closer as NASS defines federal, state powers

LegislationNigeria·Punch Nigeria·Briefly Analysis

Abstract

The Nigerian National Assembly is advancing a constitutional amendment to decentralize policing, proposing the establishment of State Police alongside the existing Nigeria Police Force. This significant legislative effort seeks to alter Sections 197, 214, and 215 of the 1999 Constitution, moving policing from the Exclusive Legislative List to the Concurrent Legislative List. The move is driven by persistent security challenges and aims to enhance local responsiveness, intelligence gathering, and accountability. However, it also raises critical concerns among legal professionals regarding potential political abuse by state governors, funding disparities, and the need for robust oversight mechanisms to prevent human rights violations and ensure effective governance of state-controlled security apparatuses.

Introduction

Nigeria stands at the cusp of a profound transformation in its security architecture, as the National Assembly progresses with a constitutional amendment bill aimed at establishing State Police. This legislative initiative, which has seen the House of Representatives pass the proposed changes and the Senate refer it to its Committee on Constitution Review, seeks to decentralize policing powers currently vested exclusively in the Federal Government. The impetus for this reform stems from the escalating insecurity across the nation, including banditry, kidnapping, and communal conflicts, which have exposed the limitations of a centralized policing system in a vast and diverse federation. [14, 18, 19, 31]

The proposed amendment represents a significant departure from the current constitutional framework, which has historically confined policing to the exclusive legislative purview of the National Assembly. By shifting policing to the Concurrent Legislative List, the amendment intends to empower state governments to establish, fund, and operate their own police forces, thereby fostering a more localized and responsive approach to law enforcement. This article delves into the legal implications of this impending constitutional restructuring, examining the existing framework, the proposed changes, the arguments for and against state policing, and the critical considerations for legal practitioners navigating this evolving landscape.

Background

The current legal framework for policing in Nigeria is primarily enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Section 214(1) unequivocally states that "there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof." [5, 8, 15, 16, 27, 28] This provision effectively centralizes policing under the control of the Federal Government, with the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) being the sole constitutionally recognized law enforcement agency. Furthermore, Item 45 of Part I of the Second Schedule to the 1999 Constitution places "Police and other government security services established by law" on the Exclusive Legislative List, meaning only the National Assembly can legislate on these matters. [23, 28]

Historically, Nigeria's policing system has been centralized since the amalgamation of various colonial forces into the Nigeria Police Force in 1930. This structure persisted post-independence, with the Inspector-General of Police appointed by the President and exercising command over the NPF across all states. [8, 16] While the Police Act 2020 repealed the earlier Police Act Cap. P19, Laws of the Federation, 2004, aiming to provide a more effective, transparent, and accountable police force and emphasizing community policing, it did not fundamentally alter the centralized command structure or the constitutional prohibition against state police. [6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17] The ongoing constitutional review process, therefore, seeks to address these foundational legal restrictions to enable the establishment of state-controlled police forces.

Analysis

The core of the proposed constitutional amendment lies in altering Sections 197, 214, and 215 of the 1999 Constitution and transferring policing from the Exclusive Legislative List to the Concurrent Legislative List. [14, 19] This shift would empower both the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly to enact laws regarding policing and security, thereby creating a dual policing structure comprising Federal and State Police. [14] The amendment process itself is rigorous, requiring a two-thirds majority vote in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, followed by approval through a resolution of not less than two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly (at least 24 states). [2, 3, 4, 9, 18, 30]

Proponents argue that decentralizing policing would lead to improved responsiveness to local security threats, enhanced intelligence gathering, and greater accountability to the communities served. [13, 19, 21, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33] They contend that a single, centrally controlled police force is inadequate for a country of Nigeria's size and diversity, where security challenges vary significantly across states. [24, 32] The *Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation* (2002) case, though not directly on policing, is instructive. The Supreme Court, in that case, affirmed the National Assembly's power to legislate on matters not exclusively on the Exclusive List if they relate to fundamental objectives, and implicitly acknowledged concurrent legislative powers where not expressly prohibited. [35, 36, 38] This precedent supports the legal possibility of moving policing to the Concurrent List, allowing both federal and state governments to legislate.

However, significant concerns persist regarding the practical implementation and potential pitfalls of state policing. Critics fear that state police forces could be susceptible to political abuse by state governors, used to suppress political opposition, intimidate voters, or serve partisan interests. [13, 21, 22, 24, 29, 32, 33] Issues of funding, training, equipment, and adherence to human rights standards are also paramount. Without robust constitutional safeguards, independent oversight mechanisms, and clear federal intervention powers in cases of abuse, decentralization could lead to a multiplication of existing problems rather than their resolution. [24, 32] Comparative federal systems, such as those in the United States, Canada, Australia, and India, offer models of decentralized policing, but also highlight the importance of strong regulatory frameworks, inter-agency cooperation, and fiscal capacity to ensure effectiveness and prevent fragmentation. [25, 39, 40, 41, 42] The proposed bill attempts to address some of these concerns by outlining strict conditions for federal intervention and new appointment and command protocols. [14]

Conclusion

The ongoing constitutional amendment to introduce State Police in Nigeria marks a pivotal moment in the nation's quest for enhanced security and true federalism. For legal practitioners, this development necessitates a deep understanding of the evolving constitutional landscape, particularly concerning the division of legislative and executive powers. Attorneys will be crucial in advising state governments on the establishment, legal frameworks, and operational guidelines for their respective police forces, as well as navigating potential jurisdictional conflicts between federal and state law enforcement agencies.

Practitioners must also be prepared to address issues of accountability, human rights, and funding mechanisms that will inevitably arise with the decentralization of policing. The success of this reform will hinge not only on the passage of the constitutional amendment but also on the meticulous drafting of enabling state laws, the establishment of independent oversight bodies, and a commitment to democratic principles by all tiers of government. Legal professionals should closely monitor the legislative process, engage in public discourse, and prepare for the significant legal and operational shifts that will redefine law enforcement in Nigeria.

Citations

  1. 1.Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)
  2. 2.Police Act 2020
  3. 3.Attorney-General of Ondo State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222