US Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration's 'Metering' Policy

The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision in *Mullin v. Al Otro Lado*, ruled that asylum seekers physically located in Mexico, even if at a U.S. port of entry, have not “arrived in the United States” for the purposes of applying for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This decision upholds the federal government’s “metering” policy, which limits the number of asylum seekers processed daily at the U.S.-Mexico border. The Court’s majority interpreted the statutory phrase “arrives in the United States” literally, concluding that physical entry into U.S. territory is a prerequisite for triggering the right to apply for asylum and receive inspection. The ruling reverses lower court decisions that had found the metering policy unlawful and has significant implications for the accessibility of asylum for noncitizens at the southern border.

The landscape of U.S. asylum law has been significantly reshaped by the Supreme Court's recent decision in *Mullin v. Al Otro Lado*, No. 25-5 (U.S. June 25, 2026). In a 6-3 split, the Court sided with the federal government, holding that an individual seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border has not “arrived in the United States” if they remain on Mexican soil, thereby precluding their statutory right to apply for asylum and receive inspection. This ruling effectively validates the controversial “metering” policy, which has historically limited the number of asylum seekers processed at ports of entry.

This decision carries profound implications for legal practitioners advising clients on U.S. immigration and asylum matters, particularly those at the southern border. By narrowly interpreting the critical phrase “arrives in the United States” found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Court has clarified, from its perspective, the geographical trigger for asylum eligibility, but in doing so, has erected a significant barrier to access for vulnerable populations. The ruling underscores the judiciary’s role in defining the practical boundaries of humanitarian protections and highlights the ongoing tension between national sovereignty and international obligations concerning refugees.

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), which govern asylum applications and inspection procedures, respectively. The Court's majority adopted a plain language reading, asserting that “arrival” necessitates physical entry. This article will delve into the statutory and doctrinal context of asylum law, analyze the Court's reasoning and the dissenting arguments, and discuss the practical ramifications for attorneys and asylum seekers.

Asylum in the United States is a form of protection granted to foreign nationals who are either physically present in the U.S. or arrive at its border, and who meet the international law definition of a “refugee.” This definition, incorporated into U.S. law by the Refugee Act of 1980, describes a refugee as a person unable or unwilling to return to their home country due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to align U.S. law with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the U.S. is a signatory, thereby incorporating key principles like non-refoulement.

Central to the *Mullin* case were two provisions of the INA: 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), which states that "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States... may apply for asylum," and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), which mandates inspection for aliens "arriving in the United States." For years, the interpretation of "arrives in the United States" has been a point of contention, particularly concerning individuals presenting themselves at official ports of entry but being turned away before physically stepping onto U.S. soil. The "metering" policy, which began in 2016 during the Obama administration and was formalized and expanded under the Trump administration, involved U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers limiting the number of asylum seekers processed daily, citing capacity constraints. This practice led to thousands of individuals waiting in precarious conditions in Mexico for weeks or months, effectively denying them immediate access to the asylum process.

The Supreme Court's majority opinion, penned by Justice Samuel Alito, adopted a textualist approach to interpret "arrives in the United States." The Court reasoned that, in ordinary parlance, one does not "arrive in" a place until one physically enters it. This interpretation rejected the Ninth Circuit's previous holding that an alien presenting themselves at the threshold of a U.S. port of entry, even while physically in Mexico, had "arrived" for statutory purposes. The majority further supported its reading by noting that other sections of the INA use language explicitly referring to aliens "near a land border" or attempting to enter, suggesting that Congress's choice of "arrives in" was deliberate and distinct from mere proximity or intent to enter.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in a forceful dissent joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, vehemently disagreed with the majority's narrow interpretation. She argued that the decision creates a dangerous loophole, allowing immigration officers to physically block asylum seekers from even initiating the asylum process, regardless of port capacity or the merits of their claims. Justice Sotomayor highlighted the humanitarian consequences, predicting an increase in deaths and illegal border crossings as individuals are denied lawful avenues for protection. Her dissent emphasized that the Refugee Act of 1980, which gave domestic effect to the 1967 Protocol, was intended to prevent the U.S. from repeating past mistakes of turning away refugees and that Congress did not intend to depart from its international obligations through the "arrives in" language.

While the "metering" policy itself was formally rescinded by the Biden administration in November 2021, the Supreme Court's decision in *Mullin v. Al Otro Lado* nonetheless affirms the legal basis for such a policy. This means that a future administration could potentially reinstate similar policies, relying on the Court's interpretation that physical entry is a prerequisite for triggering asylum rights. The ruling effectively grants the government significant discretion in controlling access to the asylum process at ports of entry, shifting the legal battleground from the legality of turnbacks to the operational definitions of "entry" and "arrival."

The majority's decision also notably declined to engage with arguments concerning the U.S.'s international law obligations, particularly the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, citing *Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.* as foreclosing such arguments in this context. This sidestepping of international humanitarian law, despite amicus briefs emphasizing its relevance, further solidifies a domestic-focused interpretation of U.S. immigration statutes, potentially distancing U.S. practice from broader international norms for refugee protection.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Mullin v. Al Otro Lado* represents a critical development in U.S. immigration law, establishing a clear, albeit restrictive, definition of when an asylum seeker "arrives in the United States." For legal practitioners, this ruling necessitates a re-evaluation of strategies for clients seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border. The emphasis on physical entry means that individuals who are prevented from crossing the border, even if they are at a port of entry and expressing a fear of persecution, may not be deemed to have triggered their statutory right to apply for asylum or to be inspected.

Attorneys must now advise clients that merely presenting oneself at a port of entry from the Mexican side may not be sufficient to invoke U.S. asylum protections. This could lead to increased reliance on alternative pathways, such as the CBP One app for scheduling appointments, or, regrettably, more dangerous irregular crossings. While the specific "metering" policy at issue is no longer active, the legal precedent set by *Mullin* empowers future administrations to implement similar border management strategies that restrict access to asylum processing based on a strict interpretation of physical presence. Practitioners should closely monitor any new administrative policies or legislative efforts that seek to address the practical implications of this decision and continue to advocate for accessible and humane asylum processes.