Villalobos v. Blanche

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently decided *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche* on July 8, 2026, a ruling that implicitly reflects the profound shift in immigration law brought about by the Supreme Court's decision in *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau* just weeks prior, on June 23, 2026. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's previous stance, clarifying that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers are not required to possess "clear and convincing evidence" of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) to treat a returning lawful permanent resident (LPR) as an applicant for admission at the border. This article examines the implications of the Supreme Court's ruling for LPRs and immigration practitioners in the Second Circuit, using *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche* as a timely example of a case now governed by this significantly altered legal standard.

On July 8, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decision in *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche*, docket numbers 23-6899-ag (L) and 24-616-ag (CON). While the specific details of the Second Circuit's opinion in this case are not yet widely disseminated, its timing is highly significant, coming just over two weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a landmark ruling in *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau*, 607 U.S. ___ (2026). That Supreme Court decision fundamentally reshaped the legal landscape concerning the re-entry rights of lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and the evidentiary burden on border officers.

This article aims to contextualize the *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche* decision within the framework established by the Supreme Court's *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau* ruling. It will analyze how the Supreme Court's clarification on the standard for treating returning LPRs as "applicants for admission" at ports of entry will directly impact immigration cases in the Second Circuit and beyond. For practitioners, understanding this shift is crucial for advising LPR clients, particularly those with any history of criminal charges, on the heightened risks associated with international travel.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) generally provides that an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States upon return from a temporary trip abroad. However, this presumption has statutory exceptions. One critical exception, outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), states that an LPR may be regarded as "seeking an admission" if they "has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title." Section 1182(a)(2) lists various grounds of inadmissibility, including crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).

Prior to the Supreme Court's intervention, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in *Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi*, 130 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2025), had adopted a more protective stance for LPRs. The Second Circuit held that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers needed to possess "clear and convincing evidence" at the border that an LPR had committed a disqualifying offense before denying normal admission and instead paroling the individual into the United States as an applicant for admission. This interpretation aimed to safeguard LPRs from being subjected to removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds based merely on suspicion or unproven charges at the port of entry. This ruling created a circuit split, leading to the Supreme Court granting certiorari.

The Supreme Court, in *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau*, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), definitively reversed the Second Circuit's position, holding that the INA does not require border officers to have "clear and convincing evidence" that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission. Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Clarence Thomas clarified that the statutory text permits border officers to parole returning LPRs based on the mere "commission" of an inadmissibility offense, not necessarily a conviction or a high evidentiary standard at the point of re-entry.

The Court emphasized that requiring frontline CBP officers to conduct a mini-trial to establish clear and convincing evidence at the border would be impractical and inconsistent with the statutory framework. Instead, heightened evidentiary standards, such as the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, are properly applied later in adversarial removal proceedings before an immigration judge. This two-step framework means that a pending criminal charge or even a suspicion of a CIMT can be sufficient for a border officer to treat an LPR as an applicant for admission, leading to parole into the U.S. and subsequent removal proceedings.

While the specific opinion for *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche* is not detailed in public summaries, its decision on July 8, 2026, by the Second Circuit, would undoubtedly be governed by this new Supreme Court precedent. Given that "Blanche" refers to the Acting Attorney General, the respondent in immigration appeals, it is highly probable that *Aguilar-Villalobos* involves an immigration matter where the petitioner, Wardis Omar Aguilar-Villalobos, was challenging an immigration decision. Indeed, Wardis Aguilar-Villalobos has a documented history of habeas corpus proceedings as a civil immigration detainee, with the Second Circuit having previously ordered a stay of removal in his case in April 2024. In light of *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau*, any arguments by Aguilar-Villalobos regarding the evidentiary standard at the border for his admission status would now be evaluated under the Supreme Court's more lenient standard for border officers, likely resulting in a less favorable outcome for the LPR than the Second Circuit's prior jurisprudence would have allowed.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Blanche v. Muk Choi Lau* marks a significant shift in the rights and vulnerabilities of lawful permanent residents, particularly within the Second Circuit's jurisdiction. The ruling in *Aguilar-Villalobos v. Blanche*, decided shortly after, exemplifies the immediate impact of this new precedent. LPRs with any unresolved criminal matters, including pending charges or even suspicions of offenses that could be classified as CIMTs, now face a heightened risk of being treated as applicants for admission upon re-entry to the United States. This can lead to parole and subsequent removal proceedings, without the government needing to meet a high evidentiary bar at the border itself.

For immigration practitioners, this necessitates a critical re-evaluation of advice given to LPR clients regarding international travel. It is more imperative than ever for LPRs to resolve any criminal issues before departing the U.S., as even a minor, unadjudicated charge can trigger significant immigration consequences at the port of entry. Attorneys must proactively counsel clients on these increased risks and prepare for a legal landscape where border officers have broader discretion to initiate inadmissibility proceedings, placing the burden on the LPR to contest removal in subsequent hearings.