DR Congo Has Taken Rwanda to the World Court Over Genocide Again. a Law Scholar Explains What's Different This Time

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has initiated a third legal challenge against Rwanda before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging acts of genocide and other atrocity crimes committed by Rwandan forces and their intermediaries from 1996 to the present day. This new 60-page complaint revives a long-standing dispute, with previous attempts by the DRC failing on jurisdictional grounds, notably due to Rwanda's reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. This article explores the historical context of the conflict and previous ICJ engagements, analyzing the potential legal strategies and challenges that distinguish this current application, particularly concerning the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction and the high evidentiary bar for proving state responsibility for genocide.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has once again escalated its long-standing grievances against its eastern neighbour, Rwanda, by filing a comprehensive lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in June 2026. This marks the third time the DRC has sought the World Court's intervention regarding alleged atrocities committed on its territory. The 60-page complaint details accusations of genocide and other atrocity crimes, purportedly perpetrated by Rwandan forces and their proxies, spanning a period from 1996 to the present day.

This renewed legal offensive comes after two prior attempts by the DRC to bring Rwanda before the ICJ ultimately failed on jurisdictional grounds. The persistent nature of the conflict in eastern DRC, coupled with the gravity of the allegations, underscores the profound importance of this new case. For legal practitioners, understanding the nuances of this latest application – particularly what distinguishes it from its predecessors – is crucial, as it could set significant precedents for international law on state responsibility for genocide and the interpretation of jurisdictional reservations.

The protracted conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has deep roots, largely stemming from the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Following the genocide, millions of Hutu refugees, including some perpetrators, fled into eastern Zaire (now DRC), leading to a series of invasions and proxy wars involving Rwanda and other regional actors. The DRC has consistently accused Rwanda of supporting various armed groups, such as the M23 rebel group, to destabilize its eastern provinces and exploit its vast mineral resources, allegations Rwanda has consistently denied.

The International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, derives its jurisdiction from the consent of states. For disputes concerning genocide, Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) provides a specific basis for jurisdiction, allowing states parties to submit disputes relating to the Convention's interpretation, application, or fulfilment to the Court. However, this jurisdiction is not absolute and can be affected by reservations made by states upon ratification.

The DRC's current application is not its first engagement with the ICJ against Rwanda. In 1999, the DRC initiated proceedings against Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda for armed aggression, but subsequently discontinued its applications against Rwanda and Burundi. A more significant attempt came in 2002 with the case concerning "Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)". In its 2006 judgment, the ICJ ultimately found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the DRC's application. A critical factor was Rwanda's reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which the Court upheld, thereby precluding jurisdiction under that treaty. The DRC had also invoked other treaties, but these too failed to establish jurisdiction for various reasons, including Rwanda not being a party or having made reservations.

The central question surrounding the DRC's latest application against Rwanda at the ICJ is what legal distinctions or new arguments might enable it to overcome the jurisdictional hurdles that thwarted previous attempts. The 2006 judgment in "Armed Activities" explicitly affirmed Rwanda's reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which excludes the ICJ's jurisdiction over disputes relating to the Convention. While the prohibition of genocide is a *jus cogens* norm, meaning it is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted, the ICJ has consistently held that the *jus cogens* nature of a norm does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction upon the Court in the absence of state consent.

One possible avenue for the DRC could be to challenge the validity or continued effect of Rwanda's reservation to Article IX, perhaps arguing that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, or that Rwanda has implicitly withdrawn it. However, the ICJ previously considered and rejected such arguments in the 2006 case. Alternatively, the DRC might present a more narrowly tailored argument, focusing on specific acts that it contends fall outside the scope of the reservation, or it could be relying on a more robust factual presentation of genocidal intent and state attribution, hoping to persuade the Court to revisit its jurisdictional stance or interpret the Convention more expansively in light of the egregious nature of the alleged crimes. The DRC's complaint explicitly attributes abuses to "Rwandan forces and their intermediaries," which will necessitate proving state responsibility for the actions of non-state actors. The ICJ's jurisprudence, notably from *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, sets a high bar for attribution, requiring a showing of "complete dependence" or "effective control" for the acts of non-state entities to be attributed to a state.

Recent ICJ jurisprudence on genocide cases, such as *The Gambia v. Myanmar* and *South Africa v. Israel*, demonstrates the Court's willingness to engage with allegations of genocide and to indicate provisional measures where claims appear "plausible," even without a final determination on the merits. While these cases primarily concerned provisional measures and did not directly address a pre-existing jurisdictional reservation like Rwanda's, they highlight the evolving landscape of state responsibility for genocide and the Court's active role in addressing such grave allegations. The DRC's 60-page complaint, covering a broad period from 1996 to the present, will require extensive evidence to establish the specific intent (*dolus specialis*) to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, which remains the most challenging element to prove in genocide cases.

The Democratic Republic of Congo's third application against Rwanda at the International Court of Justice represents a critical development in the pursuit of accountability for alleged atrocity crimes in the Great Lakes region. The success of this new case will hinge significantly on the DRC's ability to navigate the complex jurisdictional landscape, particularly in light of Rwanda's historical reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. Legal practitioners should closely monitor the preliminary objections phase, as the Court's decision on jurisdiction will be determinative and could offer new interpretations or approaches to reservations in the context of *jus cogens* norms.

Beyond jurisdiction, the case will test the evidentiary standards for proving state responsibility for genocide, especially concerning the attribution of acts by non-state intermediaries and the demonstration of genocidal intent over an extended period. The outcome will have profound implications not only for the relationship between the DRC and Rwanda but also for the broader international legal framework governing state accountability for the most heinous crimes. This litigation underscores the enduring challenges and the persistent importance of international judicial mechanisms in addressing mass atrocities.