IHRDA raises concern over defamation judgment against SERAP

The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, recently delivered a significant N100 million defamation judgment against the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare. The judgment, issued on May 5, 2026, found SERAP liable for defaming two Department of State Services (DSS) operatives, Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, through publications alleging an unlawful invasion of SERAP's office in September 2024. Beyond the substantial damages, the court ordered public apologies and post-judgment interest. This ruling has ignited widespread concern among human rights organisations and legal professionals, who warn of its potential to create a chilling effect on civic space, public-interest advocacy, and freedom of expression in Nigeria, particularly for organisations holding state institutions accountable. SERAP has since appealed the judgment, asserting it is legally flawed and a miscarriage of justice.

A recent judgment by the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, has sent ripples through Nigeria's civil society landscape, raising critical questions about the delicate balance between reputational rights and freedom of expression. On May 5, 2026, Justice Yusuf Halilu ordered the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), a prominent non-governmental organisation, to pay N100 million in damages to two operatives of the Department of State Services (DSS), Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, for defamation. The court also mandated public apologies and additional costs, stemming from SERAP's publications alleging an unlawful invasion of its Abuja office by DSS operatives in September 2024.

This substantial award and the accompanying directives have been met with strong condemnation from various human rights bodies and legal experts, who view the ruling as a significant threat to civic space and public-interest advocacy in Nigeria. The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA), among others, has voiced concerns that such a judgment could stifle the crucial work of civil society organisations in holding government institutions accountable and exposing alleged abuses. This article delves into the legal underpinnings of the judgment, its immediate implications for SERAP, and the broader ramifications for freedom of expression and the operating environment for NGOs in Nigeria.

The core thesis of this analysis is that while the protection of individual reputation is a legitimate legal concern, the application of defamation law in this context, particularly against a public interest advocacy group, risks undermining constitutional guarantees of free speech and creating a climate of fear that discourages legitimate scrutiny of state actors. The ongoing appeal by SERAP will undoubtedly serve as a critical test for the future of civic activism and accountability in Nigeria.

The legal framework for defamation in Nigeria is rooted in common law principles, statutory provisions, and constitutional guarantees. Defamation, which encompasses both libel (written or permanent form) and slander (spoken or transient form), is defined as the publication of a false statement concerning a person that injures their reputation. To succeed in a defamation claim, a plaintiff must generally prove that the statement was defamatory, referred to them, was published to a third party, and was false, thereby exposing them to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or injuring them in their profession or trade.

While the right to protect one's reputation is recognised, it operates within the broader context of fundamental human rights enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Section 39 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to limitations necessary to protect the rights and reputations of others. Defences to defamation actions under Nigerian law include justification (proving the truth of the statement), qualified privilege (where the publisher has a legal, moral, or social duty to publish, and the recipient has a corresponding interest to receive), and fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Civil society organisations like SERAP play a vital role in Nigeria's democratic space by advocating for transparency, accountability, and human rights. Their work often involves scrutinising government actions and public institutions, which inherently places them in positions where their publications may be perceived as critical or even defamatory by those in power or public service. This context highlights the tension between the state's interest in maintaining order and protecting individual reputations, and the public's interest in robust civic engagement and freedom of information.

The judgment in *Sarah John & Anor v. SERAP & Anor* centered on SERAP's publications from September 9, 2024, which alleged that DSS operatives unlawfully invaded its Abuja office, harassed, and intimidated its staff. The claimants, Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, two DSS operatives, argued that these publications, widely circulated on SERAP's website and social media, falsely portrayed them, damaged their professional reputations, and led to their suspension and disciplinary action. Justice Halilu, in his ruling, held that SERAP's publications were indeed libellous, finding that despite not explicitly naming the operatives, the descriptions provided were sufficient to identify them. The court concluded that the claims were untrue and in bad taste, particularly coming from an organisation dedicated to transparency and accountability.

SERAP, represented by Tayo Oyetibo (SAN), has strongly contested the judgment, filing an appeal and an application for a stay of execution. Their grounds of appeal include arguments that the judgment is legally defective, procedurally flawed, and unsupported by evidence. Specifically, SERAP contends that the trial court erred by allowing the amendment of the originating summons to substitute a non-juristic person (SERAP) with a juristic person (Incorporated Trustees of SERAP) and that the court relied on defective evidence, including a witness statement allegedly not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths. Furthermore, SERAP argues that the publications were protected by the defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment, as they addressed matters of public interest involving a state security agency. They also assert that the court failed to apply the objective test in defamation law, relying instead on subjective perceptions within the DSS rather than the understanding of ordinary members of the public.

The N100 million damages awarded are substantial and have been widely criticised as potentially punitive, far exceeding typical awards in similar cases and raising concerns about proportionality. The requirement for public apologies across multiple media platforms further amplifies the impact on SERAP's reputation and operational capacity. This judgment is seen by many as part of a broader trend of shrinking civic space in Nigeria, where civil society organisations and human rights defenders face increasing pressure and legal challenges for their advocacy work. The concern is that such hefty awards could deter other NGOs from investigating and reporting on alleged misconduct by public officials or state institutions, thereby undermining the constitutional right to freedom of expression and the principles of accountability and good governance.

Comparatively, international human rights standards, such as those articulated in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), to which Nigeria is a party, emphasise the importance of freedom of expression, particularly in matters of public interest. These standards often advocate for a higher threshold for defamation claims against those scrutinising public officials or institutions, and for damages to be proportionate to the harm caused, so as not to unduly restrict legitimate criticism. The current judgment, therefore, presents a critical juncture for Nigerian jurisprudence on freedom of expression and the role of civil society.

The defamation judgment against SERAP represents a significant legal development with profound implications for legal practitioners and civil society in Nigeria. The substantial damages awarded and the ancillary orders for public apologies underscore the judiciary's commitment to protecting individual reputations, even within the context of public interest advocacy. However, the widespread concern among human rights advocates highlights the potential for such rulings to be perceived as an attempt to silence critical voices and shrink the civic space, thereby impeding the vital work of accountability and transparency.

Practitioners should closely monitor SERAP's appeal, as the appellate court's decision will be crucial in clarifying the boundaries of defamation law concerning public interest organisations and the scope of constitutional freedom of expression in Nigeria. This case serves as a stark reminder of the need for meticulous factual verification and careful drafting in public advocacy, while also underscoring the ongoing tension between reputational rights and the imperative of holding power to account. Legal professionals advising NGOs and media organisations must be acutely aware of these evolving dynamics and prepare for potential challenges, advocating for a robust interpretation of freedom of expression that safeguards legitimate public discourse.