The Supreme Court’s long history of shaping race
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court has historically played a profound and often controversial role in defining race within American law, particularly concerning citizenship and immigration. From early statutes limiting naturalization to "free white persons" to landmark decisions like *Dred Scott v. Sandford* and *Plessy v. Ferguson*, the Court's interpretations have shaped who belongs and who is excluded. While the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent legislation aimed to dismantle racial barriers, recent oral arguments in *Mullin v. Doe* underscore the enduring relevance of race in contemporary immigration policy debates, demonstrating that judicial scrutiny of racial classifications remains a critical aspect of American jurisprudence.
Introduction
Race has been an indelible thread woven through the fabric of U.S. citizenship and immigration law since the nation's inception. The Supreme Court, as the ultimate arbiter of legal interpretation, has wielded immense power in defining racial categories, thereby determining who could acquire citizenship, who could enter the country, and who would be subjected to scrutiny regarding their right to reside within the United States. This judicial history is not merely a relic of the past; it continues to resonate in contemporary legal discourse, as evidenced by recent oral arguments in *Mullin v. Doe* concerning the Department of Homeland Security's actions.
The Court's decisions have not only reflected societal prejudices but have also actively shaped them, creating legal frameworks that entrenched racial hierarchies for centuries. From explicitly racial naturalization laws to the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine, the judiciary's pronouncements have had profound implications for millions of individuals and the very demographic composition of the nation. Understanding this complex legacy is crucial for legal professionals navigating the intricate interplay of race, identity, and law in modern America.
This article will explore the Supreme Court's long history of shaping race in U.S. law, tracing its evolution from early exclusionary statutes and landmark discriminatory rulings to more recent efforts to dismantle racial barriers. It will highlight key cases that illustrate the Court's interpretive power and examine how these precedents continue to inform current legal challenges, including the ongoing considerations in *Mullin v. Doe*.
Background
The foundational legal framework for citizenship in the United States initially enshrined racial discrimination. The Naturalization Act of 1790 explicitly limited naturalization to "free white persons," effectively excluding African Americans, Native Americans, and later, various Asian immigrant groups from becoming citizens. This early statute established a precedent that race, rather than merit or residency, would be a primary determinant of belonging.
The Supreme Court's most infamous early pronouncement on race and citizenship came in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The Court ruled that individuals of African descent, whether enslaved or free, were not and could never be citizens of the United States, and therefore could not sue in federal court. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's majority opinion famously asserted that Black people "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." This decision is widely regarded as one of the worst in the Court's history, exacerbating tensions that led to the Civil War.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, sought to rectify the injustice of *Dred Scott*. Its Citizenship Clause declared, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This amendment was intended to establish birthright citizenship irrespective of race, ethnicity, or parental origin. Despite this constitutional amendment, subsequent legislation and judicial interpretations continued to grapple with, and often reinforce, racial distinctions. For instance, while the Naturalization Act of 1870 extended naturalization eligibility to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent," it maintained the exclusion of other non-white groups. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 further solidified racial barriers by explicitly banning the naturalization of Chinese immigrants.
Analysis
The Supreme Court's interpretations of race continued to shape American society through a series of landmark cases. In *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court upheld Louisiana's "separate but equal" doctrine, legitimizing racial segregation across public facilities and ushering in the era of Jim Crow laws. The majority rejected the argument that segregation implied inferiority, stating that if the colored race chose to put that construction on it, it was not by reason of anything found in the act itself. This decision provided a legal veneer for systemic racial discrimination for over half a century until it was de facto overruled by *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954.
While *Plessy* entrenched segregation, *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), offered a crucial affirmation of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that a child born in the U.S. to Chinese immigrant parents, who were themselves ineligible for naturalization under existing laws, was nonetheless a U.S. citizen. This decision solidified the principle of *jus soli* (citizenship by birthplace) and served as a vital counterpoint to the era's pervasive racial restrictions on naturalization.
However, the early 20th century saw the Court continue to grapple with the definition of "white person" in naturalization cases, often with arbitrary and racially motivated outcomes. In *Ozawa v. United States*, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), the Court denied naturalization to Takao Ozawa, a Japanese immigrant who had lived in the U.S. for decades, arguing that Japanese people were not "free white persons" as popularly understood. Just a year later, in *United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind*, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the Court denied naturalization to an Indian Sikh man, Bhagat Singh Thind, despite his scientific arguments that he was Caucasian (Aryan). The Court again relied on a "common man" understanding of "white," concluding that people of Indian descent were not white, leading to the denaturalization of many Indian immigrants.
Another dark chapter in the Court's history regarding race is *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066, authorizing the internment of over 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. Despite the use of a "strict scrutiny" standard, the Court found the mass detention to be a "military necessity," a decision that has been widely criticized as one of the worst in American jurisprudence and was effectively repudiated by *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S. ___ (2018).
While the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (Immigration and Nationality Act) finally eliminated explicit racial bars to naturalization, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished the national origin quota system, the legacy of racial classification persists. This enduring influence was highlighted during oral arguments in *Mullin v. Doe*, Docket no. 25-1083, heard in April 2026. The case challenges the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Syrian and Haitian nationals, with plaintiffs alleging discriminatory animus behind the administration's actions. Justice Samuel Alito's illustration of race's continued role in immigration law during these arguments underscores that even in an era of ostensibly race-neutral laws, the historical context and potential for racial bias remain pertinent considerations for the Court.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's historical engagement with race has undeniably shaped the very definition of American citizenship and the contours of immigration law. From the explicit racial exclusions of the 18th and 19th centuries to the more subtle, yet equally impactful, interpretations of the 20th century, the Court's decisions have often reflected and reinforced prevailing racial prejudices. While landmark rulings like *Wong Kim Ark* and the eventual dismantling of overt racial barriers through legislation marked significant progress, the specter of race continues to influence legal debates, as demonstrated by the ongoing *Mullin v. Doe* case.
For legal practitioners, this history serves as a critical reminder of the need for vigilance in challenging policies that, while seemingly neutral on their face, may have disproportionate or discriminatory impacts based on race or national origin. Attorneys must be prepared to articulate how historical precedents, even those formally overturned, continue to inform contemporary legal arguments and influence judicial perspectives. The Supreme Court's long history of shaping race underscores that the pursuit of true equality before the law remains an ongoing endeavor, requiring constant scrutiny of governmental actions and judicial interpretations in immigration and civil rights contexts.
Citations
- 1.Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103
- 2.Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)
- 3.14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
- 4.Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254
- 5.Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
- 6.Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
- 7.United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
- 8.Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)
- 9.United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)
- 10.Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
- 11.Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
- 12.Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
- 13.Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
- 14.Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
- 15.Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)
- 16.Mullin v. Dahlia Doe, Docket No. 25-1083 (U.S. argued April 29, 2026)
