State police: Afenifere weighs in, urging NASS to make it independent

The Nigerian National Assembly has passed a constitutional amendment bill to establish State Police, a significant step towards decentralizing policing in response to escalating insecurity. However, the pan-Yoruba socio-political group, Afenifere, has voiced strong concerns, urging the National Assembly to review provisions in the Bill that they contend would render the proposed State Police forces mere appendages of the federal government. Afenifere advocates for genuine autonomy by placing policing squarely on the Concurrent Legislative List, thereby granting states greater control over their security architecture. This article examines the legislative developments, Afenifere's specific objections, and the implications for federalism and effective policing in Nigeria.

Nigeria stands at a critical juncture in its security architecture, with the National Assembly recently passing a landmark constitutional amendment bill aimed at establishing State Police. This legislative move, long advocated by various stakeholders, seeks to decentralize policing powers currently vested exclusively in the federal government, in a bid to address the nation's pervasive insecurity challenges, including banditry, kidnapping, and terrorism. The passage of the Bill by both chambers of the National Assembly marks a significant milestone, moving the country closer to a dual policing system.

Despite widespread commendation for this initiative, the proposed legislation has drawn scrutiny from prominent socio-political groups. Notably, Afenifere, a leading Yoruba socio-political organization, has expressed reservations, arguing that certain provisions within the Bill undermine the very essence of state autonomy. The group contends that the current draft risks making state police forces extensions of the federal government, rather than independent entities accountable to their respective states.

This article delves into the constitutional and legislative context surrounding the establishment of State Police in Nigeria. It critically examines Afenifere's concerns regarding federal overreach and analyzes the specific clauses in the proposed Bill that could potentially compromise the independence of state policing. Ultimately, it highlights the imperative for a truly decentralized policing framework that balances national standards with state-level control to foster effective security and strengthen Nigeria's federal democratic principles.

Historically, policing in Nigeria has been a centralized federal responsibility, enshrined in Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which establishes a single Nigeria Police Force and explicitly prohibits the creation of any other police force for the Federation or any part thereof. This constitutional provision has been the bedrock of Nigeria's unitary policing structure, despite its federal system of government. The Police Act 2020, which repealed the Police Act 2004, aimed to enhance accountability and transparency within the Nigeria Police Force but did not fundamentally alter the centralized command structure.

Over the past decades, persistent and escalating security challenges, ranging from insurgency in the North-East to banditry, kidnapping, and farmer-herder clashes across various regions, have severely overstretched the federal police force. State governors, often designated as 'chief security officers' of their states, have frequently lamented their lack of direct operational control over police commissioners, despite being held responsible for security breaches within their jurisdictions. These challenges have intensified calls for a decentralized policing system, with many advocating for the establishment of State Police as a crucial step towards improving local intelligence gathering, response times, and community policing.

The current legislative effort, spearheaded by President Bola Tinubu's administration, seeks to amend key sections of the 1999 Constitution, including Sections 197, 214, and 215, to transfer policing from the Exclusive Legislative List to the Concurrent Legislative List. This amendment, which has passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives, is now awaiting ratification by at least two-thirds (24) of the 36 State Houses of Assembly before it can be transmitted for presidential assent. The proposed Bill aims to provide a constitutional framework for states to establish and operate their own police services alongside the federal police, while also defining the scope of powers and responsibilities for both federal and state policing entities.

While the constitutional amendment for State Police is widely seen as a progressive step, Afenifere's intervention highlights critical concerns regarding the true independence and operational autonomy of these proposed state forces. The pan-Yoruba group specifically urged the National Assembly to ensure that policing is placed squarely on the Concurrent Legislative List, arguing that the Bill, in its current form, contains clauses that would make State Police "appendages of the federal government" and "strengthen the stronghold of the federal government on state police rather than liberalising it."

Several provisions within the proposed Bill appear to contribute to these concerns. For instance, the National Assembly is empowered to make laws prescribing the "framework for the structure, powers and approved guidelines of state and community Police." This broad supervisory legislative authority, even after states establish their forces, could be interpreted as a mechanism for federal control. Furthermore, the Bill provides for federal government representation and the inclusion of federal bodies, such as the Public Complaints Commission and the National Human Rights Commission, in the composition of the State Police Service Commission. While intended to ensure oversight and accountability, this federal presence could dilute state control over crucial aspects like recruitment, promotion, and discipline.

Another significant area of potential federal influence lies in the provisions for intervention and certification. The Bill allows the Federal Police to intervene in a state where there is a "complete breakdown of law and order" that the State Police is unable to handle, or upon the request of a State Governor. More critically, a State Police force cannot commence operations until it has been certified as meeting "national minimum standards in the manner prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly." This certification requirement, while ostensibly a quality-control mechanism, effectively grants the federal government a gatekeeping role, potentially enabling it to dictate operational parameters and standards, thereby limiting state autonomy.

Funding mechanisms also present a point of contention. The Bill proposes that the Federal Government "may" provide grants and aid to State Police, subject to the recommendation of the Federal Police Service Commission and National Assembly approval. The discretionary nature of this funding, coupled with the absence of a federal minimum funding obligation, places significant fiscal responsibility on states. This could create a dependency on federal largesse, potentially compromising the independence of state police forces, particularly in financially weaker states. While Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu has asserted that the Bill includes safeguards against political abuse, such as prohibiting governors from unlawfully targeting individuals or parties, the interplay of these federal oversight and intervention clauses with the stated goal of state autonomy remains a critical area for review.

The ongoing constitutional amendment to establish State Police in Nigeria represents a pivotal moment in the nation's quest for enhanced security and true federalism. While the broad consensus for decentralizing policing is a welcome development, the concerns raised by Afenifere underscore the importance of ensuring that the legislative framework truly empowers states with genuine control over their security apparatus. The current provisions, which allow for significant federal oversight, intervention, and discretionary funding, risk undermining the operational independence of the proposed State Police forces.

For legal practitioners, particularly those advising state governments or involved in constitutional law, a close examination of the final Bill and its implementing legislation will be crucial. Attention must be paid to the precise delineation of powers between federal and state police, the composition and independence of State Police Service Commissions, and the mechanisms for funding and accountability. The National Assembly is urged to revisit the contentious clauses to strike a better balance, ensuring that the State Police are not merely extensions of federal authority but truly autonomous entities capable of responding effectively to local security needs, thereby strengthening democratic governance and public safety across Nigeria.